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 Undocumented immigration used to be the concern of only states that shared a 
southern border with Mexico or that contained traditional immigrant gateway cities. No 
longer. Immigration legislation made the policy agenda in all 50 states in 2007, with 46 
states enacting into law a total of 240 immigration-related bills. These bills reflect state 
legislators' intent on managing the largely Latino undocumented immigrant population, 
with some legislators working to enact legislation that either restricts or expands this 
group's access to state benefits. Understanding the personal-, district-, and state-level 
influences on state legislator behavior in this policy arena is important for understanding 
the relationship between entrenched power and the representation of disempowered 
minority groups in the U.S. federal system. The immigration policy arena heightens the 
salience of both legislators own racial and ethnic characteristics and those of their 
constituents, making it ideal for assessing legislators' representational roles.  
 This dissertation builds upon and challenges the scholarly literature in the two 
 
 
separate, but linked, fields of state immigration policy and Latino descriptive 
representation. Prior scholarship on state immigration policy has focused entirely on state 
immigration policy adoption, leaving scholars none the wiser of legislators' substantive 
representation of Latino interests in this context. Additionally, several scholarly works 
have found that Latino legislators offer descriptive representation to Latino interests—
representation based on a common ethnic tie beyond that which can be attributed to 
constituency and party influences—but these findings have been limited by their analysis 
of Latino descriptive behavior only in states with large Latino populations. This 
dissertation's analysis of a new, expansive database of state legislator behavior on state 
immigration policy at the bill sponsorship, committee referral, and floor voting legislative 
policymaking stages in both chambers of 49 state legislatures challenges conventional 
scholarly knowledge of the representational role of legislators on Latino issues. It finds 
that legislators' substantive and descriptive representation of Latino interests is contextual 
based on the type of legislation and the stage of the policymaking process. Latino 
legislators' descriptive representation is further confined to whether the legislation 
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Chapter 1: Understanding State Legislative Behavior on 
Immigration Policy 
In June 2007, immigration reform legislation providing a path to citizenship for some 
undocumented immigrants stalled in the U.S. Senate, despite strong support from 
President George W. Bush and members of Congress on both sides of the aisle. But, as 
Cecilia Muñoz of the National Council of LaRaza, the nation’s largest Latino civil rights 
group, noted, “The issue is not going to evaporate because Congress failed to act.” 
Indeed, undocumented immigration into the U.S. has received increasing attention at the 
state and local levels in recent years. An estimated 10.6 million immigrants have come to 
the U.S. since 2000, a number that represents 27.7% of the total foreign-born population 
currently in the country. Many immigrants, and particularly Latino immigrants, have set 
up residence in states that lack the infrastructure to facilitate immigrant incorporation and 
which are unaccustomed to such large numbers of new populations.  
 Significant undocumented immigration used to be the concern of only those states 
that shared a southern border with Mexico or that contained traditional immigrant 
gateway cities like New York or Illinois. No longer. While the enactment of high-profile 
state immigration legislation in Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama has recently refocused 
national-level media attention on state immigration policymaking, the recent spike in 
states' consideration of immigration policies started in 2005.
1
 Legislators in all 50 states 
introduced a total of 1,562 bills related to immigration in 2007, the first year in which an 
immigration bill was introduced in every state legislature (see Appendix A), and almost 
three times the number introduced in 2006. Forty-six states enacted into law a total of 240 
                                                 
1
  The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) finds that 2005 is the year in which state 




immigration-related bills in 2007, more than triple the 84 enacted in 32 states in 2006 
(Hegen 2008). U.S. sub-national governments have gone down this legislative road 
before, most recently in the 1980s and early 1990s during which time they crafted 
legislation aimed at sending anti-immigrant, often nativist messages to the largely Latino 
immigrant populations. Bills introduced in this new wave of state immigration legislation 
cover a wider gamut of public policy arenas, and of messages sent. Some states continue 
to carry the banner of restrictive immigration sentiment, passing legislation that restricts 
undocumented immigrants' rights to receive social welfare services, resident tuition, and 
enables state police to question resident status. Other states strike a more welcoming tone 
by passing legislation that expands immigrant rights by offering services in languages 
other than English, higher education at resident rates, and works to prevent abuse of 
immigrant populations. These state immigration policies have grave real-world effects on 
the largely Latino
2
 undocumented immigrant communities they target; they determine 
how the estimated 11.6 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States 
interact with state law enforcement, receive social, health, and educational services, and 
integrate with the state economy, and can influence undocumented immigrants' decision 
to migrate to or emigrate from a state (see, for example, PBS 2011).   
 This research builds upon and challenges the scholarly literature in two separate, 
but linked, fields of study, those of state immigration policy and Latino descriptive 
representation. The few studies that have examined the large increase in state 
                                                 
2
  Immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondurus, Brazil, and Ecuador were estimated 
by the Department of Homeland Security to comprise ¾ of the estimated 11.6 million undocumented 
immigrants in the U.S. in 2008 (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2009). There is evidence that the primary source 
of immigration to the U.S. is changing from Latin America to Asia, partially as a result of lower 
immigration from Latin America due to the economic downturn that hit the United States in 2008. 
Immigrants from Asia are, as a whole, much better educated, wealthier, and more likely to enter the United 
States legally than are immigrants from Latin America (Pew Research Center 2012).    
3 
 
immigration policy activism that began in 2005 focus exclusively on state policy 
adoption, either of specific immigration-related policies—in-state tuition policy for 
undocumented immigrants (Reich and Barth 2010), federal/state cooperative immigration 
law enforcement policy (Creek and Yoder 2012), and state immigration employment 
policy (Newman et al. 2012)—or of immigration policy of a specific tone: restrictive or 
expansive of immigrant rights (Monogan 2010; Sanchez, Sanchez, and Ybarra 2012; 
Chavez and Provine 2009). This study differs from this existing scholarship by building 
off of and expanding upon Pearson-Merkowitz and Yoder's (2009) first attempt to analyze 
state immigration policy using individual legislator-level data. Previous studies have 
found state citizen ideology (Creek and Yoder 2012; Monogan 2010; Newman et al. 
2012) or partisanship (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2013) or the partisan lean of the 
legislature or of the governor (see, for example, Sanchez, Sanchez, and Ybarra 2012; 
Chavez and Provine 2009; Reich and Barth 2010) amongst the most powerful indicators 
of state adoption of state immigration policy that either expands or restricts immigrant 
rights. This current research tests such findings at the individual legislator level by 
examining state legislators' behavior on state immigration policy in both legislative 
chambers of 49 states. It finds inconsistent evidence of individual partisanship and little 
evidence of citizen ideological influences on state legislator behavior on immigration 
policy across the legislative policymaking process when controlling for other state-, 
district-, and personal-level variables.    
4 
 
 This study also adds to and challenges our growing knowledge of Latino political 
power. The past several decades have seen marked increases in the percentage of the 
Latino population overall, its percentage of the voting electorate, and in the number of 
government positions held by Latinos at all levels of government. At the state level, 
Latinos have made impressive gains in state legislatures (see Figure 1.1), even if these 
gains still lag behind the Latino percentage of the population in every state (see Appendix 
A). This increase in Latino state legislators, however, does not necessarily translate into 
representation that has a substantive policy impact. What impact does being Latino have 
on a legislator's championing of Latino interests? Does it matter that state legislators look 
like America? These questions are important, because without this substantive tie, growth 
in the number of Latino legislators provides no significant benefit for Latino interests 
over that of electing non-Latino legislators. Several scholarly works (Bratton 2002; 
Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Rouse 2013) have found that Latino legislators offer 
descriptive representation to Latino interests—that is, representation based on a common 











Figure 1.1: Total Percentages of Latino State Legislators and of Latinos in U.S. 
Population, by Year
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ethnic tie beyond that which can be attributed to constituency and party influences. To 
test whether Latino legislators descriptively represent Latino interests, controlling for 
constituency and party influences, I examine whether Latino state legislators' support of 
state immigration legislation that either expands or restricts the rights of the largely 
Latino immigrant community in the 48 chambers of the 34 states that had Latino 
legislators in 2007 differed from that of their non-Latino colleagues. This research finds 
that Latino legislators' descriptive representation of Latino interests is contextual, based 
on whether the legislation poses a threat to the largely Latino undocumented immigrant 
community. I address both of these questions by analyzing a newly created database of 
state legislator behavior on immigration legislation at the bill sponsorship, committee, 
and chamber floor vote stages of the legislative policymaking process.  
Literature Review 
State Immigration Policy 
Contrary to popular belief, state immigration policy activism is not a recent phenomenon. 
Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, individual states and localities 
primarily determined their own immigration policy until the Supreme Court ruled in 
Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1875) that immigration policy should be uniform and 
under federal jurisdiction (Tichenor 2002). Though state governments lack the power of 
the federal government to grant citizenship or to fully enforce immigration provisions 
through deportation, they can still enact legislation that impacts immigration within the 
guidelines set by the federal government. These guidelines are still being contested; the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States (2012) preempting many measures 
included in Arizona's SB1070 was just the courts' most recent reconfirmation of the 
federal government's preeminent role formulating immigration policy.  
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 One common explanation used by state legislators to explain the recent increase in 
state immigration policy activism is the corresponding lack of comprehensive federal 
immigration policy. Pennsylvania state representative Daryl Metcalfe, founder of the 
restrictive-immigration policy advocacy group State Legislators for Legal Immigration 
(SLLI), explains that “since Washington D.C. remains AWOL on fulfilling its 
Constitutional responsibilities to secure our nation’s borders against foreign invaders, it is 
not only incumbent, but the obligation for state lawmakers to step up and do the job that 
our federal government refuses to do” (SLLI 2007). Though this perspective slights the 
historical dynamism of the state/federal relationship on immigration policy,
3
 most 
scholars agree that the recent increase in state immigration policy activism is related to 
state and local jurisdictions' needs associated with the changing character of recent 
immigration that have gone unaddressed at the federal level.
4
  
 Over the past two decades, immigration from Latin America has spread beyond 
the few traditional gateway cities and border states (Frey 2006; McConnell 2008; Passel 
                                                 
3
  States enact immigration legislation both in response to federal action and inaction in the 
immigration policy arena. California's passage of Proposition 187 in 1994 was the state's way of dealing 
with the failure of the federal government to address the state's concerns in the Immigration Act of 1990, 
which eased restrictions on and increased the quota of potential immigrants to the U.S. The overturning of 
Proposition 187 by the federal courts led California's large congressional delegation to push for 
immigration reform at the national level. This pressure to nationalize what had been state policy impelled 
the federal government to act once again (Spiro 1997), eventually leading to the passage of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. IIRIRA included many of the 
provisions that California and other states with high undocumented immigrant populations wanted; namely, 
it tightened restrictions on the amount of time an immigrant could stay in the U.S., increased provisions for 
deportation, and strengthened penalties for undocumented immigrants. No federal immigration policy will 
address all states' needs, so state immigration policy is likely to continue regardless of federal action on 
immigration policy. The dynamic interaction between the U.S. sub-national governments and the federal 
government on immigration policy is also subject to changes in the intergovernmental relationship. Recent 
increases in state immigration policy activism mirror a larger trend of state conflict with the federal 
government that began under the George W. Bush administration in several policy areas, including welfare, 
environmental, employment, and law enforcement policy (Krane 2007).  
4
  Though the failure of immigration reform at the national level has been heavily cited in the 
scholarly literature, and jurisdictional need has been supported by scholarly findings (for example, Boushey 
and Luedtkey 2011; Hopkins 2010), Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2013) provide an alternative take on 
state and localities' increasing passage of restrictive immigration legislation, arguing that this uptick has 
been partisan, as Republican legislators see political gain in this issue area. 
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and Cohn 2011), which has created unanticipated policy problems and costs for new 
immigrant destinations. State and local governments legislate immigration policy in part 
because they bear the fiscal burden of educating immigrant children (Fix and Passel 
1994), providing health care and public welfare programs (Hero and Preuhs 2007), and 
are the sole providers of integration policy for immigrant populations (Fix et al. 2008). 
States and localities with rapid increases in ethnic heterogeneity due to the influx of 
immigrant populations have generally crafted restrictive policy solutions in response to 
these new populations (Boushey and Luedtkey 2011; Hopkins 2010), while states with a 
firmly established immigrant population have generally crafted more expansive 
immigration policy (Boushey and Luedtke 2011).   
Previous state attempts to restrict undocumented immigrants' access to state social 
services have been challenged on their constitutionality. The Supreme Court's decision in 
Plyler v. Doe (1982) finding unconstitutional a 1975 Texas law restricting undocumented 
children from primary and secondary school education has barred states from regulating 
immigrant access in this specific policy area, though states are free to regulate 
undocumented immigrants access to public higher education (Reich and Barth 2010). The 
current wave of restrictive state immigration legislation undoubtedly follows from 
California's Proposition 187, which limited undocumented immigrants' access to a wide 
range of state public services and which a federal judge quickly found an unconstitutional 
infringement on the federal government's plenary power over immigration policy 
(Calavita 1996). The political science literature richly details state governments' 
enactment of restrictive English-only legislation and ballot initiatives through studies of 
public opinion (see, for example, Hood III, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Hood III and 
8 
 
Morris 2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Tolbert and Hero 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; 
Valenty and Sylvia 2004) and state-level policy enactment (Schildkraut 2001; Tatalovich 
1995). While the few studies that examine the large increase in state immigration policy 
activism that began in 2005 focus exclusively on state policy adoption, either of specific 
immigration-related policies—in-state tuition policy for undocumented immigrants 
(Reich and Barth 2010), federal/state cooperative immigration law enforcement policy 
(Creek and Yoder 2012), and state immigration employment policy (Newman et al. 
2012)—or of immigration policy of a specific tone: restrictive or expansive of immigrant 
rights (Monogan 2010; Sanchez, Sanchez, and Ybarra 2012; Chavez and Provine 2009). 
 This study builds off of and expands upon Pearson-Merkowitz and Yoder's (2009) 
first attempt to analyze state immigration policy using individual legislator-level data. 
Previous studies found state citizen ideology (Creek and Yoder 2012; Monogan 2010; 
Newman et al. 2012) or partisanship (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2013) and the 
partisan lean of the legislature or of the governor (see, for example, Sanchez, Sanchez, 
and Ybarra 2012; Chavez and Provine 2009; Reich and Barth 2010) amongst the most 
powerful indicators of state adoption of state immigration policy that either expands or 
restricts immigrant rights. This research evaluates whether such findings hold in relation 
to individual state legislators' behavior on state immigration policy. 
Latino Descriptive Representation 
Pitkin's (1967) definitions of descriptive and substantive representation have provided a 
starting point for empirical tests of the kinds of representation minority groups receive in 
legislative bodies. Descriptive representatives are those who “look like” the represented 
community. For Pitkin (1967), descriptive representatives were but a mirror of the 
citizenry, while substantive representatives were those who act to reflect the represented 
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community's interests. Pitkin (1967), in positing that descriptive representation matters 
because of the assumption “that people's characteristics are a guide to the actions they 
will take" (89), points to the link recent scholars of legislators' representational roles have 
made between descriptive and substantive representation. Bratton (2006) finds this link in 
her study of the representational role of Latino state legislators, noting that Latino 
legislators (descriptive representatives) were more likely than non-Latino legislators to 
further Latino interests, thus becoming substantive representatives. Rouse (2013) reflects 
the current focus of empirical scholarship on this link in writing “a constituency is 
substantively represented if a legislator or legislative body advances the interests of that 
constituency even if the demographic characteristics of the constituency are not 
reflected” by the member (12). This evolving framework is helpful in clarifying the 
representational behavior of minority group legislators; their behavior furthering group 
interests beyond that expected by constituency or party concerns becomes descriptive 
representation, while minority group interests furthered by a legislator not of that 
minority group becomes substantive representation. Our working test of the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation thereby becomes whether a legislator's 
personal characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender influences their behavior on 
legislation that furthers the interests of their ascriptive group beyond that related to their 
constituency or party representation.  
 Evidence of such a link proves important for the representation of traditionally 
numerically underrepresented minority groups. Given this link, if present in every 
legislative body, then a constant factor in the measurement of the representation of 
minority group interests becomes whether the percentages of minority group members in 
10 
 
legislative bodies reflects that of the electorate. In a practical sense, if minority group 
descriptive representatives advance minority group interests beyond that of a non-
minority group member given the same constituency and party concerns, then the 
election of descriptive representatives must become the primary concern of minority 
groups. As Rouse (2013, 10) nicely summarizes, a finding of Latino descriptive 
representation “points to the fact that minority groups have been historically 
underrepresented or misrepresented by non-minorities within the legislative process; that 
non-minorities cannot or will not advocate in the same way for the policy interests of 
minorities.” 
 Several scholarly works have found evidence of the descriptive representation of 
Latino interests by Latino legislators (Bratton 2002; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Rouse 
2013), but not uniformly across all stages of the legislative process. Indeed, we should 
expect different stimuli to influence legislator behavior at different stages of the 
legislative process. Whereas state legislators at other stages of the policymaking process 
may be motivated by party influences, legislative sponsorship is an individual act linked 
in past political science scholarship (see, for example, Bratton 2006; Bratton and Haynie 
1999; Barnello and Bratton 2007; but see Bratton and Rouse 2011 on state legislative co-
sponsorship behavior) to distinct district- and individual-level pressures. We would 
expect to see legislators sponsor immigration policy responding to the ideological, racial, 
ethnic, and socioeconomic consistency of their district as well as that which directly 
relates to their personal representational wishes. As such, previous research (Bratton 
2002; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Rouse 2013) finds that minority legislators provide 
descriptive representation beyond that called upon by constituent representation to 
11 
 
members of their own group through their sponsorship activity. Further, in comparing 
enacted legislation with the broader population of sponsored legislation, these scholars 
find that minority group legislators are significantly less likely to have the legislation 
they sponsor enacted into law than are legislators from other ethnic or racial groups. 
 Committees move legislation from bill sponsorship, an individual act, to the floor 
vote, a collective act of the entire legislative chamber. In the interim, a small subset of the 
legislative body, committee members, can have a disproportionate influence over policy 
formulation through the bill markup and committee bill amendment processes. 
Committee members therefore have “disproportionate access into the crucial early stages 
of decision making and a valuable forum for position taking and credit claiming” (Evans 
1999, 610). Committee action is also relatively hidden from constituents when compared 
to bill introductions, committee hearings, or floor votes. This opacity can provide 
legislators necessary leeway from constituent concerns to engage in legislative actions 
that impact policy in more substantive and in less symbolic, position taking ways.  
 Differences in the ethnic and racial composition of legislative committees matters 
because African-American and Latino legislators' behavior in committees differs from 
that of their white colleagues on issues relating to their ethnic groups (Gamble 2007; 
Minta 2009; Ellis and Wilson 2013). Though Rouse (2013) has examined how Latino 
legislators descriptively represent Latino interests in state legislative committees—
finding some evidence of descriptive representation in two of the four state legislative 
chambers she studied—her focus was on members' formal committee participation. 
Committee members may well influence committee action beyond that witnessed in a 
markup or a committee hearing. Legislators unable to attend a formal committee markup 
12 
 
may have collaborated on proposed changes with committee colleagues informally, or 
may have had a legislator act in their steed, both examples of participation that would be 
missed in measuring individual legislator's formal participation.  
 A broader measure than markup participation, simple committee composition, 
may better capture this informal influence. There has been little analysis of how the 
composition of committees, and how equal or unequal committee composition vis-a-vis 
the composition of the full chamber, can influence policy outcomes. There has likewise 
been little analysis of the composition of the committees to which bills are referred. 
Examining the composition of the committees to which state immigration legislation is 
referred may well prove illustrative of whether minority group legislators are able to 
descriptively represent their own group or substantively represent other ethnic groups at 
the committee stage of the legislative policymaking process. Descriptive representatives, 
both by acting in ways that enhance support for minority group interests and by bringing 
otherwise absent policy issues to the fore, “may shape a substantially more favorable 
policy environment for the representation of minority interests” (Ellis and Wilson 2013, 
2).  
 Legislative floor action occupies the last legislative step in the legislative 
policymaking process, and one that determines whether a bill will advance to the 
executive for signature into law or veto. Legislator behavior at the roll-call voting stage 
faces different pressures than those that influence legislator behavior at earlier stages of 
the policymaking process. Whereas state legislative sponsorship and the composition of 
legislative committees may be motivated predominantly by district- and personal-level 
influences, legislative roll-call voting has been linked in past political science scholarship 
13 
 
with considerable party pressures (see, for example, Cox and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich 
1995; Rohde 1991; but see Krehbiel 1993). Roll-call voting therefore is a policymaking 
stage that offers a distinct arena in which to analyze legislators' reactions to unique 
pressures. The legislative floor is the only stage in the policymaking process where all 
members of the legislative chamber have equal access and ability to formally act on a 
bill. Whereas analyzing state legislator sponsorship and the composition of committees 
that oversee state immigration policy provides important clues about the policy 
preferences of the state legislators with the most interest in the policy, analyzing 
legislator behavior through roll-call votes is important because doing so provides 
information on how state legislators as a whole behave in response to policy. The roll-call 
vote also remains the most visible of the policymaking stages to constituents, who do not 
as closely follow the sponsorship and committee behavior of their representatives. The 
transparency of the roll-call vote makes it an ideal policymaking stage for the testing of 
constituency influence on legislative behavior.  
 Research has found that minority group legislators provide descriptive 
representation to the minority groups they represent by voting differently at the roll-call 
stage than do their respective white and male colleagues (Swers 1998; 2002; Norton 
1999; Welch 1985; Hogan 2008; Vega and Firestone 1995; Tate 2004; Swain 2006; 
Haynie 2001; Grose 2005; Barrett 1995; Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Kerr and 
Miller 1997; Preuhs and Juenke 2011; Casellas 2010; Rouse 2013). Indeed, recent 
research has found that party- and district-pressures prove influential in state legislators' 
roll-call voting behavior on all (Casellas 2011) and on only Latino-interest legislation 
(Rouse 2013).  
14 
 
 Recent studies have examined the influence of legislators' ethnicity (Rocca, 
Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Kerr and Miller 1997; Preuhs and Juenke 2011; Casellas 
2010; Rouse 2013) on their roll-call voting behavior. Though both Rouse (2013) and 
Casellas (2010) argue that such studies are important to understanding the descriptive and 
substantive representation of Latinos by their elected legislators, only Rouse (2013) has 
so far focused exclusively on the roll-call voting behavior of legislators on legislation that 
disproportionately affects Latinos. Her study of Latino descriptive representation 
compares Latino legislators' roll-call voting behavior on both general legislation and on 
that which she classifies as Latino interest legislation, finding little in the way of 
descriptive representation by Latino legislators for Latino interests at the roll-call voting 
stage of the policymaking process. 
 State legislatures represent an ideal setting in which to study minority group 
descriptive representation. The 50 state legislatures differ widely in the ascriptive 
characteristics of their legislators, in the demographics of the districts they represent, and 
in the types of bills introduced and advanced through the legislative policymaking 
process. Political theorists at least as early as James Madison argued that state 
governments are closer to and legislate and implement policies that have a larger impact 
on the daily lives of their citizens. Studying immigration policy in state legislatures 
enables investigation of how variation in Latinos' legislative presence impacts Latino 
interests at each stage of the legislative policymaking process. If Latinos offer descriptive 
representation to Latino interests, then state immigration policymaking in states where 
Latinos comprise a higher percentage of their state legislature, like in California, New 
Mexico, and Texas, should differ from that in states that have much lower percentages of 
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Latino state legislators, like Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. 
 Two works
5
 have focused specifically on Latino descriptive representation in state 
legislatures. Bratton (2006) finds that descriptive representation among Latino legislators 
is particularly activated by immigration legislation, and that Latino legislators are more 
likely to introduce and pursue legislation beneficial to immigrant populations. Rouse's 
(2013) is the only study to examine the representative behavior of Latino state legislators 
across multiple stages of the legislative policymaking process. Her analysis finds that 
Latino legislators' provision of descriptive representation on Latino interest issues is 
conditional upon the contexts of the legislative policy stage and upon the state legislature. 
Her study is also unique in that it works to separate out the behavior of Latino legislators 
on specifically Latino interest legislation. These studies of Latino descriptive 
representation in state legislatures have so far largely mirrored the map of traditional 
immigrant receiving states. They have focused analysis on the heavily Latino states of 
California, Florida, Illinois, and Texas (Bratton 2006) and Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas (Rouse 2013).  
Increasingly, scholarship will be called upon to match the real-world spread of 
recent significant immigration streams beyond these gateway states to determine whether 
Latino interests are being represented in the states unaccustomed to providing services to 
new immigrant communities. Latino state legislators in these new immigrant destination 
states likely labor within a different context than those in states with a large Latino base 
of support in the public and with an ample and supportive Latino legislative caucus. 
Latino legislators in states with comparatively fewer Latinos and Latino legislators may 
                                                 
5
  Casellas (2011) focuses on Latino legislators at both the congressional and the state levels, but 
looks across all legislation rather than at that pertaining only to Latino interests. 
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be less willing to sponsor and work to further Latino interest legislation that has little 
support amongst the public or other legislators. Likewise, Latino legislators in these 
states may be more willing to attend to budgetary or political concerns in introducing or 
working to enact legislation that restricts undocumented immigrants’ access to state 
services.  
 My research addresses Latino legislators’ descriptive representation of Latino 
interests by utilizing a unique database of state legislative behavior on state immigration 
policy through each stage of the legislative policymaking process. In separating out the 
influence of legislators' Latino ethnicity on their legislative behavior, I account for 
political, district, and other personal-level influences on their behavior. By pooling the 
actions of Latino state legislators on state immigration policy across the 50 chambers of 
the 36
6
 state legislatures in which Latino legislators serve and focusing at each stage of 
the legislative policymaking process, I am able to draw conclusions from my findings on 
Latino legislators' descriptive representation that are, in some ways, more generalizable 
to the behavior of Latino legislators than are those of previous studies.
7
 
Latino Representation and State Immigration Policy 
Immigration policy is an ideal arena in which to study Latino descriptive representation 
as past research has found that immigration policy is an issue area to which Latinos pay 
disproportionate attention. Latinos consistently rank immigration higher as an important 
issue (see, for example, Carroll 2007a) and are more likely to favor either expanding 
                                                 
6
  The total number of states and chambers with Latinos serving is 37 and 51, respectively. Nebraska 
had one serving Latino legislator in its unicameral state legislature in 2007. However, it is excluded due to 
its nonpartisan legislature. 
7
  Prior studies that have focused on Latino descriptive representation in only a few legislatures 
(Bratton 2006; Casellas 2011; Rouse (2013) have examined a much broader range of policy than does this 
study. Bratton (2006) and Rouse (2013) both examine policies that they believe appeal particularly to 
Latinos, while Casellas looks at all policy areas. These studies also examine Latino legislators' behavior 
across multiple years, while this dissertation only looks at Latino legislators actions on state immigration 
policy in 2007. 
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immigration or keeping it at the same levels (see, for example, Carroll 2007b; de le Garza 
and DeSipio 1993; Cain and Kiewiet 1987) than are members of other racial or ethnic 
groups. While some work (Rouse 2013) argues that immigration policy is not as high a 
priority amongst the Latino community as are policy issues like education or health care, 
the large-scale mobilization of Latinos in mass public protests intermittently since 2006 
in response to the passage of restrictive state immigration policies like Arizona's SB1070 
and of federal movement on immigration policy shows that policy to restrict immigration 
and immigrant rights motivates Latinos to political action. Immigration policy, therefore, 
is the type of policy about which “attentive publics,” those most affected by the law, 
would be concerned (Arnold 1992), which translates into a policy area in which we can 
expect Latino legislators to offer clear descriptive representation to Latinos. As this 
dissertation explicitly argues, the nature of the immigration policy under legislative 
consideration matters in terms of the legislative response of Latino legislators; restrictive 
immigration policy threatens the Latino community, leading Latino legislators to 
explicitly represent the broader Latino community on those policies.  
 The immigration policy arena also naturally raises the salience of specific ethnic 
and racial conflicts, so that studying immigration policy also yields important insights on 
legislator behavior in response to legislators' racial and ethnic personal characteristics and 
those of their constituencies. Indeed, several political science works have studied racial 
and ethnic conflict through the lens of state immigration policy (Tatalovich 1995; Hood 
III, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Hood III and Morris 2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Tolbert 
and Hero 2001; Valenty and Sylvia 2004). Using immigration policy to study racial and 
ethnic relations allows testing of racial threat and group coalition theories to frame the 
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reactions of African-Americans to Latino interests. At the heart of these analyses is 
whether members of other social groups provide substantive representation to Latinos. 
 Two other important considerations play into the choice of state immigration 
policy as a vehicle to study Latino descriptive representation. First, these policies are 
wide-spread enough—state immigration policies were introduced in 98 of the 99 state 
legislative chambers, and reached a floor vote in 45 state legislatures in 2007, and in the 
48 chambers in the 34 states in which Latino legislators served—to allow for a pooled 
cross-sectional sample that is representative of the full population of Latino state 
legislators. This allows for the drawing of conclusions on Latino legislators' 
representational behavior on state immigration policy that are more generalizable across 
all Latino legislators than are previous studies that only examined Latino legislators' 
behavior in only a few states (but see note 7).  
 Second, the nature of state immigration policy and the hypothesized Latino 
reaction to it is uniquely dichotomous; Latino legislators are expected to support 
legislation that expands immigrant rights and to withhold their support of legislation that 
restricts immigrant rights. The interaction between the dichotomy of state immigration 
legislation and of Latino legislators' hypothesized behavior in reaction to it allows for 
multiple tests of Latino legislators' descriptive representational behavior. It also provides 
a richer view of Latino-interest legislation than that previously studied (Rouse 2013), 
recognizing that such legislation can be favorable or inimical to Latino interests, and that 
Latino legislator behavior may differ accordingly. 
Research Outline 
I analyze the full universe of state legislators to draw generalizable conclusions about the 
behavior of state legislators on state immigration policy and about the quality of Latino 
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legislators' representation. To do so, I first created a dataset of all state legislators serving 
in 2007 in both chambers of 49 state legislatures.
8
 This dataset contains characteristics for 
each legislator at the personal- (gender, race, ethnicity, party, service in party leadership, 
chamber of service), district- (district percentage Latino, African-American, below the 
poverty line, population change from 2000-2006, and the legislator's percentage 
Republican vote in their last election), and state-levels (unemployment rate, citizen 
ideology, measures of legislative professionalism, and whether located on the U.S. 
foreign border, percentage Latino legislators in each chamber of the state legislature).  
 I next paired these data with information on the state immigration legislation 
introduced in each state in 2007, compiled by the Migration Policy Institute and New 
York University’s School of Law (2007) and published as "State Responses to 
Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation." I utilized their dichotomous coding of 
state immigration legislation that either expands or that restricts immigrant rights. Doing 
so required researching and coding whether each of the 7,300+ state legislators 
introduced, served on a committee that oversaw, or cast a vote on the legislative floor on 
one of the 576 state immigration measures that fit into this dichotomous classification 
(313 that expand and 263 that restrict immigrant rights). I analyzed this newly created 
dataset using Ordinary Least Squares, probit, and negative binomial regression models to 
assess the influences on state legislators' behavior on state immigration policy in general 
and, more specifically, whether Latino legislators provide more support for measures that 
expand immigrant rights, and less support for measures that restrict immigrant rights, 
than do non-Latino legislators when controlling for the predominant personal-, district-, 
and state-level factors shown to influence legislative behavior. 
                                                 
8
  See note 6. 
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 Chapter 2 focuses on state legislators' agenda-setting behavior as measured 
through their sponsorship of state immigration legislation that expands or restricts the 
rights of immigrants. Its findings indicate that state-level factors such as state 
unemployment and whether a state resides on the U.S. border, and district-level 
influences like the percentages of Latinos and of population change in a legislator's 
district explain the sponsorship actions of state legislators on state immigration policy. 
Party affiliation, when controlling for the effects of all other variables, has limited 
substantive effect on legislators' sponsorship of state immigration policy. No evidence of 
descriptive representation by Latino legislators of Latino interests is shown at this 
agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process. Chapter 3 assesses the composition of 
the legislative committees to which state immigration policy was referred in 2007. 
Studies of representation in state legislative committees have focused on the influence 
minority group legislators have through participation in committee markups or on the 
representativeness of the committees as a whole as a measure of the appointment power 
of political leadership. By analyzing the composition of legislative committees to which 
state immigration policy is referred, this chapter assesses for the first time how minority 
group legislator representation in committees might influence substantive policy 
outcomes. The findings indicate that Latino legislators are no more or less likely to serve 
on committees referred immigration policy than are non-Latino legislators. Chapter 4 
analyzes state legislator roll-call voting in the 33 states that held roll-call votes on 
expansive or restrictive immigration legislation in 2007. It finds that Latino legislators 
descriptively represent Latino interests through their roll-call votes on restrictive 
immigration legislation, when Latino interests are most threatened. Chapter 5 summarizes 
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the results of the empirical analyses, placing the behavior of state legislators and of 
Latino state legislators within the framework of the extant literatures on state immigration 
policy adoption and on Latino descriptive representation. In doing so, it lays out a theory 
of issue salience for Latino legislators' descriptive representation. 
 Carefully tracing the path of these uniquely dichotomous state immigration bills 
through the legislative process in each state provides a nuanced assessment of where and 
how state legislators’ actions matter to policy outcomes. Electing members of one party 
as proxies to advance Latinos interests in the state immigration policy realm may not be 
an effective strategy, nor is electing Latino legislators an effective way to expand the 
rights of the largely Latino undocumented immigrant community. When looking across 
all state legislators, the Latino descriptive representation found at the bill introduction 
stage in prior research becomes increasing conditional on the potential effect of the 
legislation on the Latino community. Electing Latino representatives to state legislative 
positions seems to benefit Latinos most when the rights of the largely Latino immigrant 
community is under greatest threat in the form of restrictive immigration legislation. 
These findings drive further investigation into the impact that legislators' social identity 
has on their representational roles.   
Methodological Note 
Most dissertations on state and local politics include a case study chapter. This one does 
not. Case studies are appropriate to give an in-depth example of the typical way a 
political process works given a small number of cases, which is the approach taken by 
most such research in this subfield. This research is unique among dissertations in the 
state and local politics subfield in the breadth of states included in its quantitative 
analysis; conducting a case study is less illustrative in this case as there is no one state 
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that exemplifies the way that state legislators more broadly and Latino legislators more 
specifically make policy decisions. Future work beyond the scope of this research might 
do well to conduct multiple case studies across a range of states judged typical of state 




Chapter 2: Assessing Legislative Representation through State 
Immigration Policy Bill Sponsorship  
Despite the recent high-profile state immigration enactments, and most notably Arizona's 
enactment of SB1070, only a few studies have analyzed this most recent wave of state 
immigration policymaking. These few extant comparative state studies have almost 
exclusively examined state immigration policymaking through a policy adoption 
framework (Chavez and Provine 2009; Monogan 2009; Newman et al. 2010; Newton 
2012; Reich and Barth 2010; Sanchez, Sanchez, and Ybarra 2012). These help develop 
our understanding of the preconditions for state immigration policy enactment, but they 
do little to advance our knowledge of the motivations of individual legislators to support 
immigration policy or of the policymaking process in the state immigration policy realm. 
Studying individual legislator behavior in the immigration policymaking realm provides 
several opportunities not available when studying state immigration policy adoption. 
 This chapter's focus on individual legislator sponsorship behavior extends the 
range of immigration policy studied from the hundreds of immigration bills that states 
enact, to the more than a thousand that legislators have introduced onto the legislative 
policy agenda. This shift in emphasis provides a more robust picture of the internal 
legislative policymaking process on immigration legislation in the U.S. Focusing on the 
actions of individual legislators also allows analysis of the effects of legislators' personal 
characteristics—legislators' ethnicity, race, and gender—on their descriptive and 
substantive representation of the predominantly Latino immigrant population, of 
legislators' individual representation of their district, and of legislators collective 
representation of state interests. Finally, the immigration policy arena naturally heightens 
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the salience of specific ethnic and racial characteristics,
9
 so that the study of state 
legislator sponsorship behavior on immigration policy also yields important insight on 
legislator behavior in response to racial and ethnic constituencies. Such analyses are not 
possible when analyzing state policy adoption. 
 Sponsoring legislation is the necessary first step toward enacting legislation, and 
agenda setting affects other stages of the policymaking process by defining the range of 
alternative policy outcomes. Legislator sponsorship behavior faces different pressures 
than those that influence legislator behavior at later stages of the policymaking process. 
Whereas state legislators at other stages of the policy process may be motivated by party 
influences, legislative sponsorship is an individual act linked in past political science 
scholarship (see, for example, Bratton 2006; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Barnello and 
Bratton 2007; but see Bratton and Rouse 2011 on state legislative cosponsorship 
behavior) to distinct district- and individual-level pressures.  
 The uneven dispersal of immigration nationwide (Frey 2006; McConnell 2008; 
Passel and Cohn 2011) has made immigration policy more salient in specific states and in 
specific districts. Legislators respond to the interaction between their state and districts' 
economic and demographic abilities to handle the strength of the immigration flow with 
targeted legislative policy solutions. While prior research has found that enacted state 
public policy does ultimately represent a state's collective ideology (Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver 1995), it is individual legislators, held accountable by district electoral politics, 
who place immigration policy on the legislative agenda. While a robust research tradition 
theorizes that legislators respond primarily to re-elective motives (Mayhew 1974), others 
                                                 
9
  Several political science works study racial and ethnic conflict through the lens of state 
immigration policy (see, for example, Tatalovich 1995; Hood III, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Hood III and 
Morris 2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Tolbert and Hero 2001; Valenty and Sylvia 2004). 
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(Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Carson, Lebo, Koger, and Young 2010) note that 
members often take actions in loyalty to their party that contradict this seemingly unified 
focus on reelection, and that these actions can have negative electoral outcomes. While 
studies of legislative sponsorship acknowledge both of these motivations, several have 
found that state legislators also sponsor legislation to descriptively and substantively 
represent the group interests of specific gender, racial, and ethnic groups (Bratton 2006; 
Bratton and Haynie 1999; Barnello and Bratton 2007), at times independent of 
constituent or party pressure. The extent to which legislators also represent the collective 
needs of their state, rather than their individual re-elective needs and that of a specific 
race, ethnicity, or gender remains an open question. The immigration policy response to 
these pressures has been two types of immigration legislation: that which expands or that 
which restricts government protection and services to undocumented immigrants.  
 Extrapolating from the findings of the state legislative sponsorship and the state 
immigration policy adoption literature, we can expect that the ethnic and ideological 
composition of a legislator's constituency as well as personal-level factors like a 
legislator's gender, ethnicity, and race will impact state legislator sponsorship of state 
immigration policy. This study is novel from previous studies in both its substantive 
focus and in the data it employs. It is the first work of state legislative sponsorship to 
examine the state immigration policy context, to analyze the full population of all state 
legislators, and to examine state legislators' collective representation of state needs. 
Legislative Sponsorship 
Though most of the scholarly work on public policymaking and legislator behavior 
focuses on the end of the policymaking process—floor voting or bill enactment—
scholars have good reason to analyze bill sponsorship as a measure of legislator intent 
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and agenda setting. Bill sponsorships are plentiful enough in any given policy area and 
legislative year to allow for the use of more robust methods than that which can be 
confidently employed for statistical models of a much more limited number of states or 
bill enactments. Bill sponsorships are also less beholden
10
 than are bill enactments to the 
many legislature-specific variations in institutional rules and norms inherent in the U.S. 
federalist system. Finally, much previous work has focused on the critical mass a 
minority group needs within a legislature to enact policies that substantively address 
minority group concerns (Kanter 1977; Dahlerup 1988). As Rouse (2013) rightly notes, 
studying agenda setting through bill sponsorship pulls the discussion from what minority 
groups can accomplish as a critical legislative mass, to what individual legislators with 
certain characteristics can accomplish as critical actors.   
 Bill sponsorship, argue Burstein, Bauldry, and Froese (2005), more accurately 
reflects the issues on the legislative policy agenda than does a tally of enacted legislation. 
Agenda setting affects other stages of the policymaking process by defining the range of 
alternative policy outcomes. Sponsoring legislation is the necessary first step toward 
enacting legislation, but legislators may behave differently in response to different 
pressures when they sponsor legislation than when they vote on the floor or in committee. 
Talbert and Potoski (2002) find that sponsored legislation reflects multiple policy issue 
dimensions, but that floor voting reflects only one: ideology/party.  
 Sponsoring a bill is an action that is individual, purposive, and direct in that it 
sends a clear message to a legislator’s constituents (Schiller 1995). Such clarity is in 
                                                 
10
  This is not to say that bill sponsorship is immune to the many state-level variations in institutional 
rules and behavior. While most states allow but single sponsors of legislation, many allow multiple 
sponsorship, others limit sponsorship, and others allow committee sponsorship. To the author’s knowledge, 




contrast to legislative action in committee or on the floor, where party cues often hold 
sway. Though an individual act, bill sponsorship is not without cost. A sponsoring 
legislator and their staff pay the opportunity cost of drafting sponsored legislation, as well 
as any potential political costs associated with position taking (Schiller 1995), which are 
high enough that a legislator would not undertake sponsorship without a substantial 
interest in the issue. In their drive to satisfy their primary re-elective motive (Mayhew 
1974), legislators sponsor bills to claim credit by advertising to constituents and the 
media that they took a position on a bill of importance to their district (Fenno 1995). 
These behaviors match well with theories of legislator behavior as being focused 
primarily on winning reelection, and legislator sponsorship behavior should then 
correlate with the specific ideological, racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic characteristics of 
their district. 
Schiller (1995) finds that individual- and constituency-level characteristics 
influence sponsorship behavior. Bratton and Haynie (1999) divide these pressures further 
into constituency representation and descriptive representation models. The legislator in 
the constituency representation model reacts solely to district and party needs in 
sponsoring legislation; the legislator in the descriptive representation model sponsors 
legislation that responds to the needs of the individual legislator's gender, ethnic, or racial 
group. Bill sponsorship has received the most scholarly attention in this latter context, 
particularly in examining whether the representation of women (see, for example, 
Thomas 1991; Saint-Germain 1989; Vega and Firestone 1995; Swers 2002) and of ethnic 
or racial groups (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bratton 2006) in legislatures has been 
substantive or merely symbolic. The bill sponsorship stage is where the tie between 
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descriptive and substantive representation is the most distinct (Bratton and Haynie 1999; 
Swers 2002; Bratton 2005). 
 This research has found distinct gender differences in the number and topic of 
legislation sponsored by state legislators, with female legislators more likely than male 
legislators to sponsor legislation related to women, children, and the family (Thomas 
1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; and Swers 2002; Reingold 2000), whereas male 
legislators will sponsor legislation on these same issues given the right interaction of 
personal-level characteristics like their race, education, age, and family circumstances 
(Barnello and Bratton 2007). Legislators' race and ethnicity also influence which type of 
legislation they sponsor, with Latino legislators more likely to introduce legislation 
beneficial to immigrant populations (Bratton 2002), and with African-American 
legislators more likely to sponsor bills that disproportionately impact African Americans 
(Tate 2004). Only a few studies have analyzed the influence of institutional-, district-, and 
personal-level factors together on state legislators' sponsorship behavior (Hogan, Kromer, 
and Wrzenski 2006; Kromer 2008). These studies' findings support a rational choice 
perspective of state legislator sponsorship behavior in finding that legislators sponsor 
legislation in response to constituency concerns. 
 Based on this understanding of the sponsorship and state immigration policy 
scholarship, I expect state legislative sponsorship of immigration bills to be a function of 
legislators' district constituency pressures and personal characteristics. Several political 
science theories offer testable hypotheses for understanding the relationship between 
individual- and district-level characteristics and state immigration bill sponsorship. 
Personal and District Characteristics 
The heart of the re-election motive (Mayhew 1974), the demographic and political 
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composition of a legislator's district should be directly tied to their legislative action. One 
theory that ties district demographics to legislator behavior is group conflict theory, 
which holds that a rapid increase in an ethnically or racially distinct, politically 
disempowered population provokes majority-group hostility (Williams 1947; Blalock 
1967). As the size or percentage of the minority group increases, so too do negative 
majority-group opinion and the number of restrictive laws targeted at the minority group.  
 Attaching the struggle for economic or political power by an entrenched majority 
group and an infringing minority group yields realistic group conflict theory (Bobo 
1999), which can be readily applied to the immigration policy context. Natives polled in 
the 2000 General Social Survey entwine their negative perceptions of immigration with 
the economy, with a majority of respondents reporting immigration as responsible for 
increased unemployment rates (Rumbaut and Ewing 2007). Common to the federal-level 
debate over immigration reform is the mantra that immigrants, particularly 
undocumented immigrants, undermine wages in certain sectors and take jobs that 
otherwise would go to native-born Americans (Newton 2008), and public opinion toward 
immigration has been found to reflect concerns about the national economy and about 
taxes (Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Lee and Ottati 2002; Lee Ottati and 
Hussain 2001). Economic status also interacts with public opinion on immigration, with 
those who are better off having fewer concerns about immigration and those who are 
economically vulnerable having greater concerns over increased immigration (Burns and 
Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997). Immigrants may instigate a threat response in tough 
economic times in particular. These opinions may translate into immigration policy; if the 
local population is having a hard time securing work, then newcomers who also need jobs 
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are unlikely to be met with open arms. Additionally, race can factor into economic threat, 
as jobs filled by immigrants are not evenly distributed throughout the American economy, 
but cluster in low-skilled positions, a disproportionate percentage of which are held by 
low-income African Americans (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).  
 Race and ethnicity are also a factor in that the composition of the recent wave of 
immigration is largely Latino, a stark difference from previous, primarily white 
immigrant waves. This ethnic identifier may stoke hostility and prejudice among natives 
that increase with the size of the immigrant group (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005; 
Chandler and Tsai 2001; Rocha and Espino 2009). Rapid shifts in a district's demographic 
composition might also signal a disproportionate increase in immigrant influx, as well as 
demographic instability. Hopkins (2010) finds that rapid increases in a locale's ethnic 
diversity increases natives' hostile political attitudes about immigrants, and the chances of 
that locale passing restrictive immigration legislation.  
 Debate does exist, however, over whether African Americans see arriving Latino 
immigrants as a racial or economic threat or as a potential minority political coalition 
partner (see, for example, Kaufmann 2003) to counter majority white political power. 
Some research on Latino representation (see Bratton 2002; 2006) indicates that at times 
Latinos find substantive representation in African-American legislators. In particular, 
since many anti-immigrant initiatives parallel anti-civil rights legislation of the past, 
minority legislators have been known to bind together against potentially discriminatory 
attacks from white legislators. African-American and Latino groups also share similar 
economic positions in American society, with the poverty rates of both groups almost 
three times that of non-Hispanic whites, and with levels of the insured and average level 
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of education much more similar between African-Americans and Latinos than between 
either of these groups and whites (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). Such shared group 
characteristics may lead to shared type and direction of policymaking in African-
American legislators' substantive representation of Latino interests, particularly when 
applied to policy that attempts to expand immigrants' access in these policy areas. 
Analysis of the type of immigration legislation sponsored by African-American 
legislators and by those representing districts with large percentages of African 
Americans may also point us toward which opposing theory—group conflict or group 
coalition—best encompasses African-American legislator behavior on state immigration 
legislation that largely impacts Latinos.  
 Numerous studies have found that a legislator's gender, race, and ethnicity impact 
their legislative behavior, with many finding that these personal characteristics go beyond 
simple representation of constituency to provide descriptive representation of a group 
(Haynie 2001; Swers 2002). Bratton (2006) finds that descriptive representation among 
Latino legislators is particularly activated by immigration legislation, and that Latino 
legislators are more likely to introduce and pursue legislation beneficial to immigrant 
populations (Bratton 2002; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000). Legislators are also known to 
rely on the expertise of their colleagues in taking voting cues (Kingdon 1989); Latino 
legislators may therefore be accorded a degree of deference as experts on immigration 
issues, leading to higher rates of bill passage of immigration bills sponsored by Latino 
legislators. There may also be a constituency tie in. Latinos consistently rank immigration 
higher as an important issue than do members of other racial and ethnic groups (see, for 
example, Carroll 2007a), and Latinos are more likely to favor either expanding 
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immigration or keeping it at the same levels than are other racial or ethnic groups (see, 
for example, Carroll 2007b; de le Garza and DeSipio, 1994; Cain and Kiewiet 1987). 
Immigration policy, therefore, is the type of policy about which “attentive publics,” those 
most affected by the law, would be concerned (Arnold 1992).  
 Finally, individual legislator's gender influences the number and topic of 
legislation sponsored (Thomas 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 2002). Policy 
issues related to women, children, and the family are most likely to be associated with the 
Democratic Party or a liberal ideology (Reingold 2000), female legislators tend to be 
more liberal than male legislators on social welfare issues (Barrett 1995; Poggione 2004), 
and on issues related to African-American interests (Bratton and Haynie 1999). This 
greater female policy liberalism may also extend to social welfare issues relating to 
immigration and to the Latino minority group. However, considerable research 
contradicts these expectations specifically on women's attitudes on immigration policy, 
finding that women are generally more favorable to restrictive immigration policy than 
are men (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 
1990; Burns and Gimpel 2000). This discrepancy in the research is one important reason 
to control for the effects of gender on legislators' actions on immigration policy. 
 
Political and Ideological Considerations 
State legislator sponsorship behavior on immigration policy also ties into political and 
ideological divisions. Gimpel and Edwards (1998) argue that the 1990s immigration 
debate in Congress centered on ideological divisions over redistribution, and that as 
partisanship has become stronger and more reflective of ideology, attitudes toward 
immigration likewise have become more partisan. This polarization has at its roots 
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Latinos’ propensity to politically incorporate in support of the Democratic Party, which, 
in turn, has positioned itself as the supporter of less-restrictive immigration policy and 
has advocated more on issues Latinos find salient than have Republicans (Lewis-Beck, 
Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008). The Republican Party has been tied to restrictive 
positions on immigration policy since California Republican Governor Pete Wilson’s 
decision to publicly support Proposition 187 (Reimers 1999; Wroe 2008). Though some 
members of the Republican Party, notably George W. Bush in his time as governor of 
Texas and as president, have tried to change the party’s trajectory on immigration, many 
Republican lawmakers actively espouse restrictive immigration policy rhetoric. The 
growing Latino demographic provides conflicting impetus for both parties to act on 
immigration policy. Democrats rationally act to welcome this wave of overwhelmingly 
Latino immigration in hopes of securing a partisan advantage, while Republicans act to 
pass increasingly restrictive policy in hopes of stopping or reversing this immigration 
flow and the growth of their opponents’ partisan advantage. Partisan electoral 
competition may also play a role in the type of immigration legislation sponsored. 
Members representing competitive districts may be unwilling to take strong stands on 
contentious issues like immigration that might alienate swing voters, while legislators 
from electorally safe districts may have more freedom in their position taking.
11
  
 The ideology of a state's citizenship influences the ideology of its state legislators 
and thus of its policy outcomes (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1994), with anti-immigrant 
attitudes associated with a politically conservative ideology (Chandler and Tsai 2001). 
                                                 
11 
 Due to the potential endogeneity of having a variable at the district-level of data representing 
percent of the vote that went to the Republican candidate and having a variable at the personal-level of data 
representing a the party of the legislator (correlation of these variables is 0.75), I have run separate models 
that include only one of the variables. Neither the coefficients nor the levels of significance change in any 
statistically significant way across all of the variables in the model.  
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Citizen ideology has also been explicitly linked to enactment of state immigration 
policies, with more conservative states passing more restrictive state immigration policy 
(Chavez and Provine 2009; Citrin et al. 1990; Hero and Preuhs 2007) and more liberal 
states more expansive immigration policy (Chavez and Provine 2009; Monogan 2010). 
State-level Influences  
In addition to a state's unemployment rate and citizen ideology, a few other influences at 
the state level have been theorized to impact state legislative sponsorship. Geography 
should play a role in the type of immigration policy a state takes up. States on the U.S. 
foreign border face greater fiscal strain as they work to handle larger initial immigrant 
flows than states in the U.S. interior. Border states differ in their constituent makeup and 
in how they choose to deal with increased immigration. States like California, which has 
a more citizenry that is ideologically liberal, has tended to introduce more measures 
aimed at expanding immigrant rights in this most recent wave of state immigration 
policymaking than have, for example, states like Arizona, which are more ideologically 
conservative and which has introduced a greater number of restrictive immigration bills 
(see Appendix 1). Increased immigration borne of a state's positioning on the U.S. border 
can be handled very differently across states. We can expect that these states will take up 
more of both types of immigration policy than states on the interior. 
 Variables specific to the legislature itself have been shown to influence state 
legislative sponsorship behavior. Legislators in more-professionalized state legislatures, 
broadly defined as state legislatures that have unlimited sessions, excellent staff 
resources, and provide their members pay enough to make public service their full-time 
gig (Squire 2007), behave differently than do legislators in statehouses without these 
resources. Monagan (2010) finds that more-professionalized legislatures enact more 
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legislation that expands the rights of immigrants than do less-professionalized 
legislatures, and surmises that the increased level of careerism in more professionalized 
legislatures (Squire 1988) results in politicians who have a longer view of the increasing 
Latino demographic’s potential effects on the legislator's political career. Legislators 
serving in more-professionalized legislatures also tend to produce more legislation, likely 
a result of the greater resources provided, than do their peers in less-professionalized 
legislatures (Kousser 2004). Related, legislative rules of sponsorship are not uniform 
across all states, with 21 states having limits on the number of bills a legislator can 
introduce (NCSL 1996). In addition to formal limits, legislators may abide by informal 
norms unique to each legislature that govern sponsorship activity.  
 A careful read of the prior literature on state immigration policy and on legislator 
descriptive representation at the bill sponsorship stage yields the following primary 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: African-American state legislators will introduce more legislation 
that expands immigrant rights, and less legislation that restricts immigrant rights, 
than will non-African-American legislators. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Latino legislators will introduce more legislation that becomes law 
that expands immigrant rights and introduced fewer that contracts immigrant 
rights than will non-Latino legislators.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Legislators representing districts with rapid population increases 
will introduce more restrictive immigration bills and fewer expansive immigration 
bills than will legislators representing districts with less growth or a net exodus of 
residents.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Republican legislators will introduce more restrictive and fewer 
expansive immigration policies than will Democratic legislators.  
 
Control Measures 
A number of control variables are also included to account for legislator characteristics 
extemporaneous from this study’s focus on state legislators’ descriptive and substantive 
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representation of Latino interests through immigration policy at the bill sponsorship stage 
of the policymaking process. Briefly, gender may also play a role as female legislators 
tend to be more liberal than male legislators on social welfare issues (Barrett 1995; 
Poggione 2004) and on issues related to African-American interests (Bratton and Haynie 
1999). Female legislators may therefore offer substantive representation to Latino 
interests on immigration policy by sponsoring and working to enact more expansive and 
fewer restrictive state immigration bills than their male counterparts. However, extant 
research has found that women tend to favor more restrictive immigration policy than do 
men (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 
1990; Burns and Gimpel 2000), making gender an important control to include in the 
model. Immigration is also an economic issue, with legislators from states with higher 
unemployment rates and higher levels of district poverty expected to sponsor and work 
to enact more restrictive immigration policy to prevent influx of additional surplus labor 
than will legislators from states with lower levels of unemployment or representing 
districts with lower levels of poverty. Legislators residing in states on the U.S. border are 
expected to sponsor and work to enact more measures of both types of immigration 
legislation than are legislators in states in the interior. Legislators who work in more 
professionalized legislatures and those with a history of enacting more bills are 
expected to introduce and work to enact more immigration legislation of both types than 
are legislators who work in less professionalized legislatures or those that have a history 
of enacting fewer bills. Whether a legislator is in their party's leadership is a control 
variable without a directional hypothesis. 
Data and Methodology 
This study analyzes legislator sponsorship activity on both restrictive and expansive 
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immigration legislation across 49 states. Immigration legislation was introduced in all 50 
states, and in 98 of the 99 state legislative chambers in 2007.
12
 The 1,562 state 
immigration policy bills introduced in state legislatures in 2007 are proof of the diversity 
of policy areas immigration touches. Some state bills, like Hawaii's SR13, which declares 
the state's opposition to 2005's Real ID Act, are purely symbolic in that their enactment 
will not affect a state policy change. Others, like Montana's SB214, which, in part, 
clarifies for Workers' Compensation Act and Unemployment Insurance Law that "The 
term 'employment' does not include: . . . service performed by an alien as identified in 8 
U.S.C. 1101," specifically exclude undocumented immigrants from receiving benefits in 
currently existing law. Others still, like Washington's SCR8404, which provides 
employment and English-language training to immigrants, work to integrate immigrants 
into communities. MPI divides state immigration policy into two main groups: those that 
expand (N=313) and those that restrict (N=263) immigrant rights.
13
  
 The data for this project are compiled from multiple sources. Data on bill 
introductions were obtained from the Migration Policy Institute and New York 
University’s School of Law's (2007) "State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All 
State Legislation." This data set includes all immigration-related bills and resolutions 




Sponsorship information for each bill was compiled from state legislative websites to 
create both count and dichotomous variables for each legislative introduction of 
                                                 
12
  The Alaska Senate was the only state legislative chamber in which an immigration-related bill 
was not introduced. 
13
  Twenty-four bills (2.3% of the total number of bills introduced that fit this dichotomous coding) 
were omnibus bills coded as both expanding and contracting immigrant rights. Sponsorship totals in the 
analysis differ due to several states that allow multiple sponsors (not just cosponsors) of bills. 
14
  Information about the methodology used to find and evaluate each piece of legislation is available 
at: www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/2007methodology.pdf.  
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restrictive and of expansive immigration legislation.
15
 I distinguish between restrictive 
and expansive immigration legislation to see if their sponsorship arises out of different 
influences. The main legislator dataset contains 7,232 state legislators and 576 state 
immigration bill introductions.
16
 I also analyze a subset of this main dataset to more 
narrowly examine Latino legislators' sponsorship behavior on state immigration policy; 
this data subset examines the sponsorship behavior of the 4,524 legislators serving in the 
48 chambers of the 34 states containing Latino state legislators on 514 state immigration 
bill introductions (286 expanding immigrant rights, and 228 contracting immigrant 
rights). 
Independent Variables 
Several independent variables test for individual-, district-, and state-level influences on 
state legislative sponsorship of immigration legislation. Individual-level variables, 
including each legislator's party, leadership position, chamber, race, and gender, were 
gathered from state legislature websites. Latino ethnicity was derived from the Directory 
of Latino Elected Officials, 2007, available from the National Association of Latino 
Elected Officials (NALEO) Educational Fund. District-level demographic data, including 
percentages of Latinos, African Americans, households below the poverty level, the rate 
of each district's population change from 2000-2006, and the percentage vote for the 
                                                 
15
  Heather Creek and Karina Shklyan were instrumental coding help for this laborious task, funded, 
in part, by Dr. James Gimpel. 
16
  The number of state legislators in this dataset (N=7,232) differs from the number of state 
legislative seats in the U.S. (N=7,382) for at least three reasons. First, Nebraska's 49 legislators are not 
included in the dataset because the Nebraska legislature is non-partisan. Second, the numbers differ because 
some of the state legislative seats were vacant throughout 2007, which reduces the number of seats in the 
dataset, while for some seats there are data for both the original holder and their replacement, which 
increases the total number of legislators in this dataset. Third, not all data are available for all legislators, so 
those legislators for which election data were not available for the most recent election, or whom were 
independents or members of third parties were not included in the analysis. 
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Republican candidate in each district's most recent state legislative election,
17
 were all 
compiled from the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections (Lilley et al. 2007). State-
level variables include a state's unemployment rate, degree of state legislative 
professionalization (Squire 2007),
18
 citizen ideology (Berry et al. 2010), and whether a 
state sat on the U.S. foreign border (dichotomous). Descriptive statistics and coding 
information for each variable are included in Appendix B. 
 Four different multivariate models were run on the effects of state-, district-, and 
individual-level characteristics on state legislative sponsorship of immigration legislation 
in 2007. The unit of analysis is the legislator. Since the dependent variables testing 
legislators' descriptive representation bill sponsorship activity are strongly right-skewed 
count variables that denote the number of each type of immigration bill a legislator 
sponsored, I chose a negative binomial regression analysis. Negative binomial regression 
analysis is the standard method used in the study of state legislative sponsorship (see 
Appendix C for a summary of the scholarship on state legislative sponsorship). Each 
model utilizes a different dependent variable. The models in Table 2.3 examine the 
number of expansive and restrictive immigration bills sponsored by legislators in all state 
legislative chambers
19
 and by legislators in state legislative chambers with Latino 
legislators. Table 2.3 displays the results of probit regression models measuring whether 
legislators' actions on immigration legislation goes beyond the symbolic stage 
                                                 
17
  In some states, coding the Republican percentage of the vote for the most recent election proved 
problematic due to the existence of multimember districts. In these states, representatives often win 
elections with (sometimes) less than 30 percent of the vote because of the multimember electoral system. 
To account for this problem, I tallied the winning percentage of the district if both members were from the 
same party. If the district was split between candidates from different parties, the senator’s winning margin 
for the district in which the delegate serves was used.  
18
  The Squire Index is a widely used measure of state legislative professionalism; I used the data 
from the 2003 compilation of this index found in Squire (2007) for this project. 
19
  See note 10. 
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represented by sponsoring a bill, to substantive action to enact the bill into law. These 
models focus on whether the bills that each legislator sponsors pass the legislative 
chamber of which they are a member. Because the data for all of the models are gathered 
for individual- and also for state-level variables, the distribution of state-level variables is 
not independent among legislators, but rather clusters. In light of the clustered nature of 




Table 2.1 contains the percentages of each type of immigration legislation sponsored by 
Latino, African-American, female, Republican, and state Senators and the percentages of 
bills sponsored by each group that passed the chamber in which they were introduced in 
all state legislative chambers and in those state legislative chambers in which Latino 
legislators serve; the results of these bivariate cross tabulations are similar both for the 
full dataset and for the subset specifically examining Latino legislator behavior. These 
data provide initial support for a number of the hypotheses offered. As hypothesized, 
Latino and female legislators sponsor expansive immigration legislation at rates greater 
than, and restrictive immigration legislation at rates lower than, their respective 
percentages in the state legislatures. Latino and female legislators also see a 
disproportionate percentage of the expansive immigration bills that they sponsor pass, 
hinting that these groups work to move their representation of Latino group interests 
beyond the symbolic bill sponsorship stage and into substantive public policy. African-
                                                 
20
  Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo (2007) state that “clustering arises because the attributes of states 
in which individuals reside do not vary across individuals within each state” (448). For example, in this 
chapter's analysis the state unemployment rate, the dichotomous border variable, the degree of legislative 
professionalism, and the total bill introduction in a state legislature for 2007 for Oregon are all constant 
across all legislators from Oregon; this violates the assumption that the errors are independently distributed 
and that their variance is constant. Models with aggregate- and individual-level data must use appropriate 
statistical techniques to account for this violation of the statistical methods assumptions. Not doing so can 
lead to an overstating of the statistical significance of coefficient estimates, and particularly the coefficients 
for states.  
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American legislators likewise sponsor expansive immigration legislation at numbers 
greater than, and restrictive immigration legislation at rates much lower than, their 
percentages in state legislatures. These results lend some evidence to group coalition 
theory, which posits that African-American legislators will provide substantive 
representation to Latinos, while also putting a damper on group or economic threat 
theories, which hold that African-American elites will act against Latino group interests 
to the benefit of their own group. African-American and female legislators also see a 
disproportionate percentage of the restrictive immigration legislation that they sponsor 
pass, indicating that these legislator groups exercise considerable legislative sway on this 
policy area. As hypothesized, sponsorship of immigration legislation shows broad 
partisan underpinnings, with Republicans sponsoring restrictive immigration legislation 
at much higher, and expansive immigration legislation at lower, rates than their 
percentage composition in state legislatures, yet passing fewer of the expansive and 
restrictive bills that they introduce than their Democratic colleagues, indicating perhaps 
that Republican lawmakers are more likely to introduce legislation to take a position, 
rather than to affect public policy.  
While bivariate cross tabulations can provide a broad overview of the data, it is 
necessary to control for the effects of multiple covariates in order to draw more confident 
conclusions. Table 2.2 displays the results of negative binomial regression analyses of the 
individual-, state-, and district-level influences on legislator sponsorship of expansive and 
restrictive immigration policy. Table 2.3 displays the results of probit regression analyses 




Table 2.1. Cross-tabulations of Individual-level Factors on State Legislative Sponsorship 
and Passage of Immigration Bills, 2007 
Legislators in All State Legislative Chambers 
Independent Variable % of Sample Expansive Restrictive 
  (N=7,232) Sponsored Passed Sponsored Passed 
  (N=724) (N=197) (N=487) (N=53) 
  % % % % 
Latino 3.2 9.7 7.6 1.5 0.0 
African American 8.3 10.7 5.1 2.8 9.4 
Female 23.5 32.2 37.6 16.4 26.4 
Senate 26.1 32.4 38.6 34.1 35.9 
Republican 45.6 31.8 24.9 75.1 58.5 
            
Legislators in Chambers w/ Latino Legislators 
Independent Variable % of Sample Expansive Restrictive 
  (N=4,623) Sponsored Passed Sponsored Passed 
  (N=371) (N=122) (N=274) (N=37) 
  % % % % 
Latino 5.1 13.5 12.3 2.2 0.0 
African American 8.5 12.1 8.2 3.3 10.8 
Female 25.3 32.9 43.4 18.6 29.7 
Senate 16.5 26.7 38.5 21.5 16.2 
Republican 45.0 32.1 23.8 72.3 59.5 
 
Expansive Legislation 
Female legislators sponsor greater numbers of expansive immigration legislation, and are 
more successful at turning their sponsorship of expansive immigration measures into 
passed legislation, than male legislators. Female legislators thereby offer substantive 
representation to the largely Latino immigrant communities for which the majority of 
expansive immigration policy is written. Surprisingly, neither a legislator's party nor 
racial nor ethnic affiliations influence their sponsorship of expansive immigration 
legislation. Republican and African-American legislators are both less likely to succeed 
in passing their sponsored expansive immigration bills. For Republican members, a lack 
of their party's support coupled with an unwillingness of the Democratic Party to pass 
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legislation sponsored by the opposing party may stymie the passage of expansive 
immigration measures. African-American legislators have historically found greater 
difficulty in having the bills they sponsor get enacted than have non-African American 
legislators (Bratton and Haynie 1999).  
 Of the district-level characteristics, legislators representing districts with high 
percentages of Latinos sponsored many more expansive immigration bills than did 
legislators representing districts with low percentages of Latinos. Legislators respond to 
district reelection concerns when sponsoring expansive immigrant policies. Members 
representing poor districts are less likely to see their sponsored expansive immigration 
legislation pass than are members representing wealthy districts. Such a finding, coupled 
with a similar finding for passage of sponsored restrictive immigration legislation, could 
signify a class bias in district representation, with members representing poor districts 
having less success passing any of their sponsored legislation than those representing 
wealthy districts. Variables related to legislators' substantive representation of Latino 
interests are those that have substantive impact on legislators' sponsorship of expansive 
immigration legislation in legislative chambers in which Latino legislators serve. 
Legislators representing the poorest districts and those with the highest percentages of 
Latino and African-American constituents were most likely to sponsor expansive 






















-0.63* -0.39 -0.18 -0.06 0.21 0.07 0.36 0.13
(0.29) (0.31) (0.20) (0.22)
0.02 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
0.03* 0.41 0.02 0.14 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
-0.70* -0.08 -0.25 -0.02 -0.60 -0.04 -0.36 -0.02
(0.38) (0.41) (0.37) (0.42)
0.00 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.00** 0.46 0.00 0.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.00 -0.02 -0.001 -0.01 -0.01* -0.04 -0.01 -0.03
(0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.003)
-0.02 -0.09 -0.04*** -0.11 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
0.01 0.24 0.03*** 0.54 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.03*** 1.28 0.03*** 0.98 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.01 0.53 -0.01 -0.06 0.02* 1.34 0.01 0.26
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.27 -0.03 0.04 0.00 1.45*** 0.10 1.50*** 0.10
(0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
0.27* 0.03 0.47** 0.04 0.22 0.02 0.41 0.03
(0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.21)
0.15 0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.05 -0.00 0.06 0.00
(0.15) (0.19) (0.27) (0.37)
0.34*** 0.04 0.31* 0.03 -0.07 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21)
-0.24 -0.02 -0.50* -0.03 -0.69 -0.04 -1.13* -0.04
(0.28) (0.24) (0.53) (0.56)
0.26 0.04 0.39 0.04 -0.48 -0.02 -0.53 -0.02
(0.44) (0.39) (0.67) (0.61)
-1.85 -3.65*** -4.12*** -4.91***
(1.19) (1.32) (0.93) (1.11)
3.34 3.06 3.89 4.54
(1.63) (1.67) (1.77) (2.42)
N 4623 4623
Model chi-square 179.00 161.63 154.02 149.03
P = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2.2. Negative Binomial Predictions for Influences on Sponsorship of Immigration Legislation, 2007
1 Predicted counts calculated using the observed values approach (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013).
Notes: All p values are one-tailed except for those representing whether a legislator is African American and the 
percentage African-American of their district due to the contrasting hypotheses offered. * ≤ 0.05; ** ≤ 0.01; *** ≤ 0.001.
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Latinos and African-Americans were also more likely to have the expansive immigration 
legislation they sponsored pass their chambers, 13% and 37% more likely, respectively. 
However, legislators representing the poorest districts in chambers with Latino legislators 
were 7% less likely to have this same legislation pass their chamber. 
 Legislators from states with high unemployment rates sponsor an average of 0.39 
fewer and are 18% less likely to pass expansive immigration bills than are legislators 
from states with low unemployment rates. This supports the economic threat hypothesis, 
which states that legislators from states with high unemployment act to preserve the 
state's rare jobs for natives. Also as hypothesized, legislators from states with a more 
liberal citizenry sponsor greater numbers of expansive immigration legislation and are 
more likely to have their sponsored legislation pass than are legislators from states with a 
more conservative citizenry. Against hypothesized expectations, legislators from border 
states sponsored fewer expansive immigration bills and had fewer of their sponsored bills 
expansive immigration bills pass than did legislators from interior states. States on the 
U.S. border have long had to handle the expense of large immigrant streams without 
federal recompense; it is not surprising that these legislators are less likely to introduce 
and see through to passage legislation that welcomes additional immigration.  
 State senators and those from more professionalized legislatures also sponsored a 
greater number of expansive immigration bills than did legislators from states with less 
professionalized legislatures. 
Restrictive Legislation  
There are clear differences between what influences state legislative sponsorship of 
expansive and of restrictive immigration policy, indicating that these types of 
46 
 
immigration policy are not just two sides of the same coin. As hypothesized, Republican  
 



















-0.63** -0.18 -0.17 -0.02 0.13* 0.02 0.23** 0.01
(0.21) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10)
0.02**  0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02** -0.03 -0.03*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.00 0.05 0.004 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.004
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.56** -0.03 -0.29 -0.01 -0.22 -0.00 -0.34 -0.003
(0.29) (0.22) (0.23) (0.29)
0.00 0.06 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.0001 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.00 -0.02 -0.002 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.003)
-0.03* -0.05 -0.06*** -0.07 -0.03*** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.01 0.15 0.02*** 0.37 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.004
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
0.01 0.09 0.01* 0.13 0.01** 0.09 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00  -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.23* -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.05  0.00 0.14 0.001
(0.17) (0.09) (0.20) (0.30)
0.37*** 0.02 0.63*** 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.23 0.003
(0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.20)
0.09 0.01 0.15 0.01 -0.26 -0.00 -0.08 0.00
(0.13) (0.17) (0.35) (0.36)
0.26*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.001
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
-0.82*** -0.03 -0.95*** -0.01 0.50* 0.02 0.64* 0.01
(0.13) (0.10) (0.25) (0.29)
0.38 0.03 0.38 0.02 N/A¹ N/A1 N/A1 N/A1
(0.30) (0.25)
-0.25 -1.80*** -1.38** -1.12
(0.87) (0.65) (0.63) (0.66)
N = 7232 4623 7000 4391
Model chi-square = 249.64 644.95 92.06 222.97
P> Chi2 = 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.0000
Pseudo R2= 0.1962 0.2066 0.0949 0.1411
Table 2.3. Influences on Immigration Bill Passage
State and Legislature Characteristics
District Characteristics
Legislator Characteristics
1. No Latino legislators introduced a restrictive immigration bill that passed the legislature, so this variable was dropped.
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Democratic state legislators, a finding that well reflects the partisan rhetoric of the 
immigration policy arena at the national level, and which is itself reflective of the 
differences in the parties' bases. Partisanship continues to have a substantive impact on 
restrictive immigration policy sponsorship in chambers with Latino legislators. 
Republican members sponsor an average of 0.10 more restrictive measures than do 
Democratic members in legislative chambers in which Latino legislators serve, a number 
that mirrors the increase in restrictive immigration sponsorship by Republican members 
serving in all state legislative chambers. 
 African-American state legislators sponsored fewer restrictive immigration bills 
than did non-African-American state legislators,
21
 which provides support for the group 
coalition hypothesis. While Latino immigrant groups do not find substantive 
representation in African-American legislators for expansive immigration policies, 
neither do they find that African-American legislators set the agenda against Latino 
interests. However, when African-American legislators do sponsor restrictive 
immigration policy, it is more likely to pass than is legislation sponsored by non-African-
American legislators. This bucks previous findings that African-American legislators 
have less success passing sponsored legislation, and suggests that African-American 
legislators may be given a degree of deference in crafting legislation associated with the 
policy needs of a similar minority group. 
 As hypothesized, legislators from districts with large population increases from 
2000-2006 sponsored much more, an average of 1.34 more, restrictive immigration bills 
than did legislators from districts with lower population increases or with population 
declines. In passing restrictive immigration policy, state legislators from high-growth 
                                                 
21
  When these results were calculated at the one-tailed level of statistical significance. 
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districts may be attempting to stem this growth or to limit newcomers' access to state 
benefits. Going against the direction hypothesized, state legislators representing poor and 
highly Republican districts sponsored fewer restrictive immigration bills than did those 
from wealthy and heavily Democratic districts. Those representing poor districts are also 
less likely to pass their sponsored restrictive immigration legislation than are legislators 
representing wealthy districts. Legislators representing heavily Latino districts are 9% 
more likely to pass the restrictive immigration legislation that they sponsor than are those 
who represent less Latino districts.  
 Legislators from states with high unemployment rates are more likely to pass the 
restrictive immigration legislation that they sponsor than are those from states with low 
unemployment rates, and those from states with a more liberal citizenry are less likely to 
pass the restrictive immigration legislation that they sponsor than are those from states 
with a more conservative citizenry. These findings reflect the difficulty in getting 
restrictive immigration policy enacted in liberal states and in states with low 
unemployment. Legislators in legislatures that had more total bill sponsorships also 
sponsored, as hypothesized, a greater number of restrictive immigration bills than did 
those serving in legislatures that sponsor fewer bills. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter examines state legislator sponsorship of immigration legislation that either 
expands or restricts immigrant rights to test the findings of prior literature on state 
immigration policy adoption and on the descriptive representational roles of Latino 
legislators. It adds to the literature on state immigration policy by being the first to 
examine state legislator behavior in this policy realm, rather than that behavior 
aggregated up to policy adoption at the state level. This shift in emphasis provides deeper 
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understanding of the broader range of state immigration policies that make the legislative 
agenda, rather than just those that are enacted into policy. Studying agenda setting 
through state legislator bill sponsorship results in two findings that expand our 
knowledge of the influences that impact the setting of the state immigration policy 
agenda.  
First, legislator sponsorship of immigration bills that expand immigrant rights 
differs from legislator sponsorship of immigration bills that restrict immigrant rights. 
This difference is missed by the past research on state immigration legislation that 
conjoins expansive and restrictive immigration policy into one measure (Monogan 2010), 
and perhaps as well by work that analyzes Latino descriptive representation by looking at 
Latino-interest legislation as if it were unidirectional in nature (Rouse 2013). Latino-
interest policies, and particularly state immigration policy, can be bifurcated into policies 
that benefit and those that are detrimental to Latino interests, and not accounting for this 
nuance may lead to erroneous results. 
 Second, the state-level findings of this study both reinforce and vary from the 
findings on state immigration policy adoption of previous studies, which found state 
citizen ideology (Creek and Yoder 2012; Monogan 2010; Newman et al. 2012) or 
partisanship (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2013) and the partisan lean of the 
legislature or of the governor (see, for example, Sanchez, Sanchez, and Ybarra 2012; 
Chavez and Provine 2009; Reich and Barth 2010) amongst the most powerful indicators 
of state adoption of state immigration policy that either expands or restricts immigrant 
rights. This work finds that a legislator's personal partisanship or that of the district they 
represent is only a statistically and substantively significant influence on state legislator 
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sponsorship behavior on restrictive immigration policy. In setting the policy agenda for or 
against Latino interests, partisanship matters for the introduction of measures that restrict 
immigrant rights; at the other stages of the policymaking process examined in later 
chapters we may well see partisanship begin to influence legislator action on immigration 
policy in general as we move toward legislative enactment. 
  Focusing on the actions of individual legislators also allows analysis of the effects 
of personal characteristics on legislator sponsorship of immigration legislation, a focus 
that yields important new findings on legislators' descriptive and substantive 
representation of the predominantly Latino immigrant population.  
 State immigration laws are often highly charged pieces of legislation with very 
real and painful impacts on immigrant populations. They can determine whether 
undocumented families must uproot from their adopted land and move to less hostile 
locales, whether families living paycheck to paycheck lose or gain essential state benefits, 
and whether individuals detained for what had a been a misdemeanor might be deported. 
Yet, once controlling for all independent variables, Latino legislative sponsorship 
behavior on state immigration policy of either type does not differ from that of non-
Latino legislators. This finding goes against that of prior literature (Bratton 2002; 
Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Rouse 2013), which found significant Latino descriptive 
representation of Latino interests at the sponsorship stage of the policymaking process. 
This finding is countered by the strength of the district constituent tie in, 
legislators' substantive representation of Latino interests; legislators representing districts 
with large Latino populations sponsor a greater number of expansive immigration bills 
than do those representing districts with smaller Latino populations. These results 
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indicate that, at least at the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process, Latinos 
should not expect Latino legislators to offer a greater degree of representative attention to 
their interests than non-Latino legislators. The silver lining here is that those who 
represent districts with large percentages of Latinos are more likely to sponsor and see 
through to enactment legislation that expands the rights of the largely Latino immigrant 
community. If these results hold across the policymaking process, then Latinos might be 
better served pressuring their current legislators to support expansive immigration 
legislation than in running Latino candidates for state office.  
 These preliminary results, however, may not fully represent the work of Latino 
legislators to further Latino interests, as bill sponsorship can largely be a symbolic 
activity in which legislators claim credit for taking a position to superficially satisfy 
constituent demands. Though Latino legislators may not sponsor a disproportionate 
number of bills that further Latino interests nor have success in enacting the expansive 
legislation that they do sponsor, they may well work harder than non-Latino legislators to 
enact legislation sponsored by other legislators that furthers Latino interests in the 
committee and floor voting stages of the policymaking process, thus providing Latinos 
descriptive representation at more substantive stages of the policymaking process.   
 This study's findings also counteract the racial threat hypothesis and provide some 
support for the group coalition theory, with evidence that African-American state 
legislators are less likely to sponsor restrictive immigration legislation than are non-
African-American legislators, and those legislators who represent districts with large 
percentages of African Americans are more likely to introduce legislation that expands 
immigrant rights than are legislators who represent districts with smaller percentages of 
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African Americans. In combination with this finding of substantive representation, 
legislators who represent largely African-American districts may have greater expertise 
crafting policy that benefits both their constituents and the Hispanic constituency that is 
largely similar in many socioeconomic characteristics. 
 This study's expansive range of data—state legislator sponsorship of immigration 
policies across 49 states—is more geographically representative of state legislators than 
are previous studies that have utilized a narrower set of states in different policy realms 
(see Appendix C), meaning that its findings can be more confidently applied to state 
legislator sponsorship behavior in general.
22
 This study is the first to analyze state 
legislator sponsorship behavior across the full population of state legislators.  
 Though not its primary analytical drive, this is the first study of state legislative 
sponsorship to test the influence of a state-level economic variable, state unemployment 
rate, on state legislative sponsorship behavior. This relationship was statistically 
significant for the number of expansive immigration bills introduced, with legislators 
from states with higher unemployment sponsoring substantively fewer expansive 
immigration bills than legislators from states with low unemployment, and was 
determinative of final passage of both types of sponsored immigration policy, with states 
with higher unemployment passing fewer expansive and a greater number of restrictive 
immigration bills. As aggregate measures, state-level unemployment rates may not be 
fully independent of the unemployment rate of each of a state's legislative districts, but 
substantially variation is likely to occur, particularly in districts that represent urban 
                                                 
22 
Prior work that has examined Latino legislators' descriptive behavior (Bratton 2006; Casellas 
2011; Rouse 2013) has focused on the broader policy area of Latino-interest legislation, and has looked 
across several years of data, making those studies, in some ways, more representative of Latino legislators' 
descriptive representational behavior than this current study. 
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areas. This finding points toward state legislators' sense of collective representation, 
representation of state needs, rather than just individual representation, representation of 
district and individual needs, even after controlling for constituent needs. Though future 
work would do well in going beyond this study's analysis to control for the influence of 
other state-level factors on state legislator behavior, the findings do justify the need to 
take into account a wider range of potential influences on state legislator agenda-setting 
behavior than endogenous institutional factors related to the legislatures and the 
legislation, or even of exogenous factors related to individual legislators and their 
districts.  
 This study's findings also support Hopkins' (2010) findings of the effects of rapid 
population growth on localities' and states' immigration policy outcomes; legislators 
representing districts with large population increases introduced a substantively greater 
number of restrictive immigration bills than did legislators from districts with lower 
population growth or population declines. Legislators in these districts introduce 
measures aimed at reducing immigrant inflows. Rapid shifts in a district's demographic 
composition may signal a large immigration influx. Boushey and Luedtke (2011) find a 
similar relationship at the state level, with states with recent increases in their foreign-
born population more likely to pass restrictive immigration policy than states without 
such increases. Interestingly, this result disappears when looking only state legislator 
sponsorship behavior in state legislative chambers that contained Latino legislators. 
 Further analysis of the influences on state legislative behavior on state 
immigration policy is needed at all levels of the policymaking process. The next chapter 
will examine state legislator behavior on these immigration policies at the committee 
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stage of the policymaking process. 
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Chapter 3—Examining Representation of Latino Interests on 
Immigration in State Legislative Committees 
Research on legislative committees in general, and particularly on those in state 
legislatures, has been neglected in comparison to research on other stages of the 
policymaking process. This oversight can be attributed to greater access to quantifiable 
data at the sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and roll-call voting stages, and should not be 
viewed as a reflection of the comparative substantive importance of these stages in the 
policymaking process. Indeed, beyond sponsoring a bill, committees are where individual 
legislators have the greatest opportunity to alter legislation. The committee setting's 
relative lack of transparency to constituents also means that legislators are more likely at 
this stage to make substantive changes to legislation, rather than symbolic changes 
intended to gain constituent notice. Since legislators' personal characteristics impact their 
behavior on committees (Kathlene 1994; Rouse 2013; Rosenthal 2001), the composition 
of committees should impact policy outcomes. This chapter analyzes a new, expansive 
database of state legislative committee bill referrals in both chambers of the 49 states in 
which immigration bills were referred to a substantive committee, and bill enactments of 
state immigration policy across both legislative chambers in the 36 states which enacted 
state immigration policy in 2007 to analyze the composition of the legislative committees 
to which state immigration policy was referred. It begins the discussion of whether the 
ethnic and racial composition of committees impacts the substantive policy that a 
legislature enacts into law, and is the first work to examine state legislative committees 
across a wide sampling of chambers and states. 
State Legislative Committees 
In favoring, particularly, the roll-call voting stage of the policymaking process in their 
research, political scientists are guilty of allowing their research pursuits to follow the 
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path of more accessible data. Committees move legislation from bill sponsorship, an 
individual act, to the floor vote, a collective act of the entire legislative chamber. In the 
interim, a small subset of the legislative body, committee members, can have a 
disproportionate influence over policy formulation through the bill markup and 
committee amendment processes. Committee members therefore have “disproportionate 
access into the crucial early stages of decision making and a valuable forum for position 
taking and credit claiming” (Evans 1999, 610). Committee action is also relatively hidden 
from constituents when compared to bill introductions, committee hearings, or floor 
votes. This opacity can provide legislators necessary leeway from constituent concerns to 
engage in legislative actions that impact policy in more substantive and in less symbolic, 
position taking ways.  
 Committees also serve a gatekeeping role for public policymaking. In this role, 
the committee stage plays a much larger role in the policymaking process than does the 
roll-call voting stage. While almost every bill that is introduced in state legislatures is 
referred to a committee, as few as 20% ever emerge for floor consideration.
23
 Party 
control of the policy agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005) plays a large role in determining 
which bills emerge from committee as the majority party does not allow bills that will 
split the party vote or that will be rejected on the floor out of committee or to be 
scheduled for a floor vote. Bills that have made it through the committee process are also 
generally given considerable deference by the full chamber, as these bills have undergone 
detailed and expert review by those members with the most interest and expertise in the 
subject matter. Almost all of the bills that gain a floor vote in the state legislatures pass. 
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  Only one of the 558 restrictive and expansive immigration bills introduced in 2007 was not 
referred to any committee. Of these bills, 129 (23.1%) received a floor vote in a state legislative chamber. 
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Of the 129 immigration bills that fit in the expanding/contracting dichotomy analyzed in 




 When studied, state legislative committees have most often been used as a 
mechanism to analyze broader models of organizational theory (Hedlund 1984; Hedlund 
and Freeman 1981) and to test party control theories (Overby and Kazee 2000; Aldrich 
and Battista 2002) derived from studies of Congress (Krehbiel 1993; Cox and McCubbins 
2005). Given their key role in the policymaking process, it is important to understand the 
composition of legislative committees to understand whether legislators from ethnic or 
racial groups disproportionately impacted by a group of legislation have the opportunity 
to influence such legislation in this setting. 
 Most studies of state legislative committee composition focus on member 
ideology, finding exceedingly rare committees that do not reflect the general ideology of 
the full state legislature (Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004). 
These findings reinforce Hedlund's (1992) that it is member preference, not formal party 
control, which determines member committee assignment. Further, though the majority 
party dominates membership in committees, this majority is not disproportionate to the 
partisan composition of the chamber (Hedlund and Hamm 1996). 
 Only a few studies have examined the composition of legislative committees by 
legislator gender, race, and ethnicity. Female state legislators are more likely than their 
male colleagues to serve on health, welfare, education, and family policy committees 
(Dolan and Ford 1997), while African-American legislators are more likely than 
                                                 
24
  Both rejections, MTHB549 and MTHB735, occurred in the Montana House and restricted 




legislators from other ethnic and racial groups to serve on committees that focus on 
education, welfare, and that address African-American interests (Haynie, 2000). 
However, Bratton (2006) found that Latinos were no more likely to serve on legislative 
committees focusing on health, welfare, and education.  
 Differences in the gender, ethnic, and racial composition of legislative committees 
matters because minority group membership influences legislator committee behavior. 
Both Kathlene (1994) and Rosenthal (2001) find that male and female committee 
members and chairs behave differently in committee than do their male counterparts, and 
that this behavioral difference can impact committee policy outcomes. Gamble (2007) 
and Minta (2009) study the composition of congressional committees by African-
American and African-American and Latino legislators, respectively, finding that their 
participation differs from that of their White colleagues on issues relating to their ethnic 
groups. Ellis and Wilson (2013) find as an example of descriptive representation that 
congressional committees chaired by African-American and Latino members are more 
likely to hold hearings on minority issues than those chaired by legislators of other 
groups. 
 Spun out more broadly, committee composition matters for policy outcomes, 
which are unlikely to better represent minority interests through descriptive 
representation that does not countermand the institutional levers of power (Tate 2003). 
Indeed, Griffin and Keane (2009) find that African-American Congress members hold 
disproportionately fewer positions of power—including membership on powerful 
committees—than do members of other racial or ethnic groups, and surmise that this 
leads to unequal African-American political representation. Ellis and Wilson (2013, 2) 
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further note that “greater descriptive representation in positions with power over 
legislative agendas may be key to the functional representation of minority interests” and 
that “the marginalization of minority groups from agenda-setting processes results in part 
from descriptive underrepresentation in positions with influence over legislative 
agendas.” 
 While no work has examined African-American legislators in state legislative 
committees, Rouse (2013) has examined how Latino legislators descriptively represent 
Latino interests in state legislative committees. Her work follows Hall's (1998) 
groundbreaking analysis of Congress members' participation in committees, which uses a 
Likert scale to measure member committee participation, with member absence receiving 
a 0 to member engagement in committee markup receiving a 7. Rouse (2013) finds that 
Latino legislators provide descriptive representation on Latino interest issues, and that 
legislators of other racial groups provide substantive representation to Latinos through 
their committee participation in some state House chambers. Though Hall's (1998) 
method remains the gold standard for studying legislators' committee behavior, only a 
few studies have employed it due to the time-consuming data-collection process, which 
can be compounded in studies of state legislative committees where the availability of 
committee markup data varies by state, by chamber, and even by committee. As such, 
until state legislatures start to collect and make more readily available committee markup 
data, this is not a viable method to examine committees in more than a handful of 
chambers or legislatures. 
 Studies of other stages of the state legislative policymaking process examine the 
impact of minority group legislators on policy outcome. Prior research has found that 
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female (Thomas 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; and Swers 2002; Reingold 2000), 
African-American (Tate 2004), and Latino (Bratton 2002; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000) 
legislators provide descriptive representation beyond that called upon by constituent 
representation to members of their own group through their sponsorship activity, and in 
comparing enacted legislation with the broader population of sponsored legislation gauge 
the substantive impact of legislators' agenda-setting behavior, finding that minority group 
legislators are significantly less likely to have the legislation they sponsor enacted into 
law. Research has found that minority group legislators provide descriptive representation 
to the minority group they represent by voting differently at the roll-call stage than do 
their respective white and male colleagues (Swers 1998; 2002; Norton 1999; Welch 1985; 
Barnello 2001; Hogan 2008; Vega and Firestone 1995; Tate 2004; Swain 2006; Haynie 
2001; Grose 2005; Barrett 1995; Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Kerr and Miller 
1997; Preuhs and Juenke 2011; Casellas 2010; Rouse 2013). Though a few studies have 
examined how ethnicity and race impact legislators' committee actions (Rouse 2013; 
Gamble 2007; Minta 2009), they have examined only a few legislative chambers and 
have focused solely on members' formal committee participation. However, committee 
members may well have influence on committee action beyond that witnessed in a 
markup or a committee hearing. Legislators unable to attend a formal committee markup 
may have collaborated on proposed changes with committee colleagues informally, or 
may have had a legislator act in their steed, both examples of participation that would be 
missed in Hall's (1998) measure. A broader measure than markup participation, simple 
committee composition, may better capture this informal influence.  
 Studies of committee composition relative to the legislature as a whole have 
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focused mostly on how legislators are appointed to serve on committees and what this 
means in terms of theories of partisan control of the legislative process, and not on the 
disproportionate impact that over-representation of specific groups on committees can 
have on public policy. There has been little analysis of how the composition of 
committees, and how equal or unequal committee composition vis-à-vis the composition 
of the full chamber, can influence policy outcomes. Any one legislator likely has more 
power to influence her colleagues in the more intimate setting of the legislative 
committee than on the chamber floor. Descriptive representatives, both by acting in ways 
that enhance support for minority group interests and by bringing otherwise absent policy 
issues to the fore, “may shape a substantially more favorable policy environment for the 
representation of minority interests” (Ellis and Wilson 2013, 2). These descriptive 
representatives, however, may well be shut out of the committees that oversee legislation 
that disproportionately impacts their minority community. 
 This chapter examines the state-, district-, and personal-level characteristics of the 
legislators who comprised the state legislative committees to which expansive and 
restrictive immigration legislation was referred in 2007 in light of the composition of the 
state legislatures in general. Results will indicate whether legislators of certain 
characteristics are over- or underrepresented on the committees to which immigration 
legislation is referred. The following hypotheses, derived from social science research, 
focus the paper on the racial and ethnic composition of the state legislative committees 
that worked on immigration policy in 2007.  
Primary Hypotheses 
Numerous studies have found that a legislator's gender, race, and ethnicity impact their 
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legislative behavior, with many finding that these personal characteristics go beyond 
simple representation of constituency to provide descriptive or substantive representation 
of a group (Haynie 2001; Swers 2002). Latino legislators are more likely to introduce and 
pursue legislation beneficial to immigrant populations—to provide descriptive 
representation to Latino interests—than are non-Latino legislators (Bratton 2002; 
Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000). Legislators are also known to rely on the expertise of their 
colleagues in taking voting cues (Kingdon 1989); Latino legislators may therefore be 
accorded a degree of deference as experts on immigration issues, leading to higher rates 
of enactment of immigration bills on which Latino legislators work. There may also be a 
constituency tie in. Latinos consistently rank immigration higher as an important issue 
than do members of other racial and ethnic groups, and Latinos are more likely to favor 
either expanding or keeping immigration at the same levels than are other racial or ethnic 
groups (see, for example, de le Garza 2004). Immigration policy, therefore, is the type of 
policy about which “attentive publics,” those most affected by the law—in this case 
Latino constituents—would be concerned (Arnold 1992), and therefore Latino legislators 
can be expected to be more likely to serve on committees to which state immigration bills 
are referred. 
 The largely Latino composition of the recent wave of immigration, a stark 
difference from previous, primarily white immigrant waves, makes race and ethnicity a 
factor in legislators' immigration policy responses. The distinct ethnic character of this 
immigrant wave may stoke native hostility that increases with the size of the immigrant 
group (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005; Rocha and Espino 2009). Rapid shifts in a 
district's demographic composition may signal a large immigration influx. Hopkins 
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(2010) finds that rapid increases in a locale's ethnic diversity increases natives' hostile 
political attitudes toward immigrants, and the probability of that locale passing restrictive 
immigration legislation. Boushey and Luedtke (2011) find a similar relationship at the 
state level, with states with recent increases in their foreign-born population more likely 
to pass restrictive immigration policy than states without such increases. 
Hypothesis 1: Latino legislators will be more likely to serve on committees to 
which all types of immigration legislation is referred than will non-Latino 
legislators. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Legislators representing districts with a high percentage of 
population increase will be more likely to serve on committees to which 
restrictive immigration legislation is referred than will legislators from districts 
with low rates of population growth. 
 
Control Measures 
A number of control variables are also included to account for legislator characteristics 
extemporaneous from this chapter’s focus on state legislators’ roles descriptively and 
substantively representing minority groups in committee. Briefly, each legislator's party 
is coded because immigration is a partisan measure, with Republicans favoring more 
restrictive and Democrats more expansive immigration policy. Legislators from states 
with a more conservative citizen ideology are expected to favor more restrictive 
immigration policies, while those from states with a more liberal citizenry are expected to 
favor more expansive policies, and those that represent the most partisan Republican 
districts will oversee more restrictive and less expansive immigration policy directed to 
their committees than will those from more moderate or from the most partisan 
Democratic districts. Gender may also play a role, as female legislators tend to be more 
liberal than male legislators on social welfare issues (Barrett 1995; Poggione 2004) and 
on issues related to African-American interests (Bratton and Haynie 1999). Female 
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legislators may therefore offer substantive representation of Latino interests on 
immigration policy by serving on committees that oversee  more expansive immigration 
policy than do their male counterparts. However, research that focuses specifically on 
public policy attitudes toward immigration finds that women are more supportive of 
restrictive immigration policy than are men. These conflicting findings make gender an 
important control to include in these models. Immigration is also an economic issue, with 
legislators from states with higher unemployment rates and higher levels of district 
poverty expected to focus on more restrictive immigration policy to prevent more surplus 
labor than those from states with lower levels of unemployment or representing districts 
with lower levels of poverty. Legislators residing in states on the U.S. border are 
expected to consider more of both types of immigration legislation than are legislators in 
states in the interior. Legislators who work in more professionalized legislatures and 
those with a history of enacting more bills are expected to consider more immigration 
legislation of both types than are legislators who work in less professionalized 
legislatures or those that have a history of enacting fewer bills. Whether a legislator is in 
their party's leadership is a control variable without a directional hypothesis. 
Methods and Data 
The data for this project are compiled from multiple sources. Data on bill introductions 
were obtained from the Migration Policy Institute and New York University’s School of 
Law's (2007) "State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation." This 
dataset includes all immigration-related bills and resolutions introduced in state 
legislatures in 2007.
25
 This chapter relies on this database's coding of expansive and 
restrictive immigration legislation across the 49 states that referred such measures to 
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 in 2007 to analyze state legislators' descriptive and substantive 
representation of Latino interests.
27
 Legislative committees' racial or ethnic composition 
may impact policy outcomes, particularly in a policy area such as immigration that is 
related to race or ethnicity. Moreover, a committee may shift the bill toward or away from 
representation of the interests of a minority group when the composition of the committee 
differs from that of the chamber. In such cases, committee members play an outsized 
representational role in formulating policy that may differ from the preferences of the full 
legislative chamber. Policy voted out of committee that has been amended in committee 
too far from majority legislative preferences can always be defeated on the chamber floor, 
but at least in the context of state immigration policy in 2007 analyzed here, that is an 
exceedingly rare outcome.  
 The 558 state immigration policy bills (301 expansive and 257 restrictive 
immigration bills) that were referred to substantive committees in 49 state legislatures in 
2007, and the 88 bills that were enacted into law (60 expansive and 28 restrictive) from 
legislatures in 36 states are proof of the diversity of policy areas immigration touches. 
Some state bills, like Hawaii's SR13, which declares the state's opposition to 2005's Real 
ID Act, are purely symbolic in that their enactment will not affect a state policy change. 
Others, like Montana's SB214, which, in part, clarifies for Workers' Compensation Act 
and Unemployment Insurance Law that "The term 'employment' does not include: . . . 
service performed by an alien as identified in 8 U.S.C. 1101," specifically exclude 
undocumented immigrants from receiving benefits in currently existing law. Others still, 
                                                 
26
  Committee referrals to rules committees were excluded from this analysis because bill referral to 
this committee was the automatic option in several states, after which it may have been referred to a 
substantive committee or committees. Including this committee might skew the results. 
27
  See note 22. 
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like Washington's SCR8404, which provides employment and English-language training 
to immigrants, work to integrate immigrants into communities. This diversity is also 
reflected in the types of committees to which these bills were referred, ranging from 
Appropriations to Health and Human Services to Higher Education to Inland Fisheries 
and Wildlife committees. 
Dependent Variables 
I followed each of the 558 bills that were referred to a committee through the legislative 
process to all of the committees in both chambers to which each bill was referred, 
recording which members had a chance to oversee each bill in committee. Due to 
multiple committee referral, the 313 expansive immigration bills introduced were 
referred to a total of 467 substantive committees (and average of 1.49 committee referrals 
per bill), while the 263 introduced restrictive immigration bills were referred to a total of 
362 substantive committees (an average of 1.38 committee referrals per bill) (see 
Appendix A). In total, 2,262 legislators served on substantive committees to which 
immigration policy was referred in 2007, many serving on multiple committees. Research 
that has studied Latino representation in state legislator committees (Rouse 2013) has 
done so by selecting committees that may see Latino interest legislation, no doubt 
missing some Latino-interest bills referred to other committees. The dependent variable 
for the probit regression models (Tables 3.8 and 3.9) is whether a restrictive/expansive 
immigration bill was referred to a committee on which the legislator sits. To explicitly 
examine whether Latino state legislators were as likely as non-Latino legislators to have 
immigration legislation of both types referred to a committee on which they serve, I also 
ran models (Table 9) that examined bill referral to committee in only those legislative 
chambers that had Latino state legislators. The primary results of interest to this chapter, 
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therefore, represent the likelihood that a state legislator served on a committee to which 
an immigration bill of either type was referred, controlling for all other covariates. 
Independent Variables 
I examine several independent individual-, district-, state-, and institutional-level 
variables to determine the characteristics of the committees to which state immigration 
policy was referred. Individual-level variables, including each legislator's party, whether 
they were in the majority party, leadership position, chamber, race, and gender, were 
gathered from state legislature websites. Latino ethnicity was derived from the Directory 
of Latino Elected Officials, 2007, available from the National Association of Latino 
Elected Officials (NALEO) Educational Fund. District-level demographic data, including 
percentages of Latinos, African Americans, households below the poverty level, the rate 
of each district's population change from 2000-2006, and the percentage vote for the 
Republican candidate in each district's most recent state legislative election,
28
 were all 
compiled from the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections (Lilley et al. 2007). State-
level variables include a state's unemployment rate, degree of state legislative 
professionalization (Squire 2007),
29
 citizen ideology (Berry et al. 2010), percent Latino in 
each state legislative chamber (NALEO), and whether a state sat on the U.S. foreign 
border (dichotomous). 
 Two different multivariate models were run on the state-, institutional-, district-, 
and individual-level characteristics of the committees to which immigration bills of both 
types were referred in 2007. The primary unit of analysis is the legislator. Because the 
data for each of the models are gathered for individual- and also for state-level variables, 
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the distribution of state-level variables is not independent among legislators, but rather 
clusters. In light of the clustered nature of the data used in this chapter, the models are run 




It is important to examine whether the composition of the committees to which each type 
of immigration bill was referred mimics that of the composition of the legislatures at 
large. Committee composition matters here because of the disproportionate impact 
committee members may have on the legislative outcome of these bills. If the committees 
to which these bills were referred differed in composition from the broader legislature, 
then lawmakers that descriptively or substantively represent specific interests may have 
greater influence on this legislation than does the average legislator. 
 The preliminary findings presented in Table 3.1 are important because they show 
that the composition of the committees to which these bills are referred is different from 
the composition of the legislatures at large. Table 3.1 examines the characteristics of 
legislators who served on committees to which expansive immigration legislation was 
referred, while Table 3.2 examines the characteristics of legislators who served on 
committees to which restrictive immigration legislation was referred. There were stark 
differences between the legislators who served on committees to which both types of 
immigration legislation was referred. Legislators who served on committees that 
considered expansive immigration legislation were from states with higher levels of 
unemployment, more professional legislatures, were more likely to be on the U.S. border, 
were from districts with higher percentages of African Americans, Latinos, and more 
recent population change, were more likely to be Democratic, in the majority party, and 
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African American or Latino than were those who did not serve on committees to which 
these bills were directed. Most of these characteristics have been hypothesized as leading 
to more expansive immigration policy, except for increases in recent population, and 
from states with high unemployment rates. 
 Bill referral of restrictive state immigration policy (Table 3.2) saw similar 
differences between the characteristics of those who served on these committees. 
Legislators serving on committees referred restrictive immigration policy were from 
more conservative states with higher unemployment rates and more professional 
legislatures that were on the U.S. border, represented districts with higher levels of 
poverty, higher percentages of African Americans, Latinos, and more recent population 
changes, and were more likely to be African American or Latino. Most of these legislator 
characteristics have been hypothesized as being correlated with legislator behavior 
furthering restrictive immigration policy, excepting percentages of a legislator's district 
Latino and whether a legislator is Latino.  
 Overall, 2,262 individual legislators served on committees to which expansive 
immigration legislation was referred in 2007, and 2,089 served on committees to which 
restrictive immigration legislation was referred in 2007. Tables 3.3-3.6 display some 
bivariate descriptive statistics for the immigration bills that were referred to committees 
in relation to minority group membership on those committees. Overall, expansive 
immigration legislation was referred to committees that saw an overrepresentation of 
Latino, African-American, female, and majority party members, and where Republicans 
were underrepresented (Table 3.3). Latino legislators were similarly overrepresented on 
committees to which restrictive immigration legislation was referred. African-American 
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and Republican state legislators served on committees to which restrictive immigration 
legislation was referred in greater proportion to their composition in the legislative 
chambers that referred such legislation. Overall, 34.4% of all state legislators serving in 
states where expansive legislation was referred to committee served on a committee to 


















of Means p 
value
State and Legislature 
Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 4.28 4.35 4.24 0.00
Citizen Ideology 59.25 61.38 58.00 0.00
Legislative Professionalism 19.17 22.81 17.04 0.00
On the US Border 32.37 33.91 31.47 0.05
Total Bill Enactments 697.98 1000.46 520.17 0.00
District Characteristics
% Below Poverty 15.12 15.10 15.13 0.86
% African-American 10.48 11.59 9.84 0.00
% Latino 9.00 12.32 7.04 0.00
Population Change, '00-'06 4.92 5.53 4.55 0.00
Legislator Characteristics
Republican 44.35 41.65 45.94 0.01
Majority Party 62.13 63.99 61.04 0.02
Female 23.60 24.93 22.82 0.06
African American 7.86 9.50 6.89 0.00
Latino 3.33 5.35 2.16 0.00
N = 6110 2262 3848
Table 3.1. Difference of Means between Legislators who Served on 
Committees Where Expansive Immigration Legislation was Referred, and 
Those Who Did Not, 2007
Notes: The difference of means test is two-tailed to determine whether to reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the means of the variables. 




 A larger percentage of Latino legislators had a chance to work on both expansive 
and restrictive immigration in committee than did any other of the groupings studied 
here, with 54.5% of all Latino state legislators serving on committees to which expansive 














of Means p 
value
State and Legislature 
Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 4.43 4.55 4.37 0.00
Citizen Ideology 57.83 55.48 59.06 0.00
Legislative Professionalism 18.41 19.06 18.07 0.00
On the US Border 35.80 37.21 33.13 0.00
Total Bill Enactments 747.44 843.31 697.20 0.00
District Characteristics
% Below Poverty 15.31 15.83 15.04 0.00
% African-American 11.31 13.07 10.38 0.00
% Latino 8.55 10.27 7.65 0.00
Population Change, '00-'06 5.12 5.45 4.95 0.05
Legislator Characteristics
Republican 45.08 46.55 44.32 0.10
Majority Party 61.70 61.29 61.91 0.63
Female 23.88 23.22 24.23 0.38
African American 8.36 9.81 7.60 0.00
Latino 3.21 4.40 2.58 0.00
N = 6075 2089 3986
Table 3.2. Difference of Means between Legislators who Served on 
Committees Where Restrictive Immigration Legislation was Referred, 
and Those Who Did Not, 2007
Notes: Difference of means test is two-tailed to determine whether we can 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the means of the 
variables. Nebraska is excluded due to its non-partisan legislature.
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committees to which restrictive immigration legislation was referred. 
 
The average legislator saw 1.04 expansive immigration bills referred to a 
committee on which they served, but Latino legislators saw 1.79 expansive immigration 
bills referred to committees on which they served. African-American state legislators also 
see more of both types of bills referred to their committees, perhaps hinting at their 
service on committees whose jurisdictions are similar to those on which Latino legislators 
serve.  
  
Finally, while the average legislator saw 17.16% of the expansive state 
immigration policy referred to a committee in the state in which they served referred to a 
committee on which they served, Latino legislators saw just 16.79% of the expansive 
% of 
Legislature % of Sample
(N=6,522) Referred % of sample (N=6,548) Referred % of Sample
(N=2,262) (N=2,089)
% %
3.4 5.4 4.6 3.3 4.4 3.3
8.1 9.5 7.4 8.5 9.8 7.0
23.4 24.9 25.4 23.7 23.2 25.2
27.1 33.6 27.0 26.1 30.4 27.0
44.3 41.7 43.4 44.9 46.6 49.5
62.1 64.0 62.7 61.7 61.3 59.9







Table 3.3. Percentages of Group Legislators on Committees to which State Immigration Policy Bills 
were Referred, 2007
Independent Variable Expansive Restrictive
N Referred N Referred
(N=2,262) (N=2,089)
# % # %
222 54.5 213 43.2
531 40.5 559 36.7
564 36.6 485 31.3
759 42.6 634 37.1
940 32.6 970 33.3






Table 3.4. Percentages of Each Group of Legislators to which State 
Immigration Bills were Referred, 2007
Independent Variable Expansive Restrictive
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immigration legislation referred to committees on which they served.  
 
These bivariate comparisons, however, do not control for the impact of covariates. 
To control for the impact of these covariates, and to assess the impact of any one 
characteristic, we must use multivariate models. Table 3.7 shows the results of a probit 
model whose dependent variables are whether a legislator served on a committee to 
which each type of immigration bill was referred, and Table 3.8 shows the same model 
but only for the state legislative chambers in which Latino legislators served. The results 
are largely complementary, and so have been presented together below.  
 
 
All Legislators 1.04 0.77
Republican 0.90 0.80





African American 1.33 1.07
Table 3.5. Average Number of Immigration Bills Referred to 




Bills Referred Bills Referred
All Legislators 17.16 16.82
Republican 17.46 16.73





African American 20.54 18.46
Table 3.6. Average Percentage of Each Type of Immigration Bill 




Bills Referred Bills Referred
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Legislators from the most liberal states were 9% more likely to have expansive 
immigration legislation referred to their committees than were members from the most 
conservative states, states with the most professional legislatures were 24% more likely 
to see bills referred to their committees, than were those from the least professionalized 
legislatures, legislators from states that enact the most bills were 52% more likely and 
62% more likely in chambers with Latino legislators to have expansive immigration 
legislation referred to a committee on which they served than were those from states that 
enact the fewest number of bills, legislators from legislative chambers with the highest 
percentages of Latinos were 39% more likely overall and 28% more likely in chambers 
with Latino legislators to see expansive immigration bills referred to a committee on 
which they served than were legislators from legislative chambers with the lowest 
percentage of Latinos. 
In terms of district characteristics, legislators from districts with the highest 
percentages of African-Americans were 26% more likely to serve on a committee 
referred expansive immigration legislation in legislative chambers in which Latino 
legislators served than were legislators representing those districts with the lowest 
percentages of African Americans in the same legislative chambers, legislators from 
districts with the highest Republican vote percentage were 3% more likely to see 
expansive immigration legislation referred to a committee on which they served than 
were those from districts with the lowest percentage vote for Republican members, 
legislators from districts with the highest population change were 47% more likely to see 
expansive immigration legislation referred to a committee on which they served than 
were legislators from districts with low population change or even population loss. 
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Table 3.7. Influence of Committee Composition on Immigration Bill Committee 
Referral 
  Expansive Legislation Restrictive Legislation 











State and Legislature Characteristics 
Unemployment Rate 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.26 
  (0.10)   (0.14)   
Citizen Ideology 0.00** 0.09 -0.01 -0.23 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
Legislative Professionalism 0.01** 0.24 -0.002 -0.03 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
On U.S. Border -0.20 -0.08 -0.18 -0.06 
  (0.31)   (0.27)   
Total Bill Enactments 0.00*** 0.52 0.000008 0.17 
  (0.00)   (0.000008)   
% Latino in Chamber 0.02** 0.39 0.02** 0.35 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
District Characteristics 
% Republican Vote 0.00** 0.03 -0.002* -0.08 
  (0.00)   (0.001)   
% Below Poverty Level -0.01 -0.13 -0.004 -0.07 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
% African-American 0.00 0.07 0.002 0.07 
  (0.00)   (0.01)   
% Latino 0.01 0.20 0.003 0.11 
  (0.00)   (0.004)   
Population Change, '00-'06 0.01* 0.47 -0.002 -0.14 
  (0.00)   (0.01)   
Legislator Characteristics 
Republican -0.11* -0.04 0.11* 0.04 
  (0.05)   (0.07)   
Senator 0.38*** 0.15 0.24* 0.09 
  (0.10   (0.11)   
Leadership -0.32*** -0.11 -0.22* -0.08 
  (0.10   (0.10)   
In Chamber Majority Party 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 
  (0.03)   (0.03)   
Female 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  (0.05)   (0.05)   
African American 0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 
  (0.11)   (0.13)   
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Latino -0.07 -0.02 0.001 0.001 
  (0.13)   (0.15)   
Constant -1.09* N/A -0.62 N/A 
  (0.50)   (0.69)   
N = 5977   5948   
Wald Chi Squared 281.44   78.82   
Prob> Chi Squared 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo R2= 0.10   0.04   
Notes: All p values are one-tailed. Predicted probabilities calculated from raising an 
independent variables minimum value to its maximum value while holding other 
independent variables at their mean values.  * ≤ 0.05; ** ≤ 0.01; *** ≤ 0.001. 
 
In terms of personal legislator characteristics, Republican members were 4% less 
likely to see expansive immigration legislation referred to a committee on which they 
served than were Democratic members, senators were 15% more likely to see expansive 
immigration legislation referred to a committee on which they served, and 23% more 
likely in chambers in which Latino legislators served, than were members of the lower 
chamber, and those in leadership were 11% less likely to see expansive immigration 
legislation referred to committees on which they served than were those not in leadership. 
None of the measures of legislators' gender, race, or ethnicity proved statistically 
significant for the referral of expansive immigration legislation to a committee on which 
these members served. 
In terms of whether and how many restrictive immigration bills were referred to a 
committee on which a legislator serves, legislators in chambers with the highest 
percentages of Latinos were 35% more likely to have restrictive immigration bills 
referred to committees on which they served than were legislators who serve on 
committees in chambers with the lowest number of Latino legislators. Legislators from 
states that enact the most bills were 32% more likely in chambers with Latino legislators 
to have restrictive immigration legislation referred to a committee on which they served 
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Table 3.8. Influence of Committee Composition on Immigration Bill Committee 
Referral in States with Latino Legislators 
  Expansive Legislation Restrictive Legislation 











State and Legislature Characteristics 
Unemployment Rate 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.39 
  (0.12)   (0.16)   
Citizen Ideology 0.001 0.02 -0.01 -0.22 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
Legislative Professionalism -0.0001 -0.02 -0.01 -0.21 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
On U.S. Border -0.08 -0.03 -0.26 -0.10 
  (0.28)   (0.34)   
Total Bill Enactments 0.0001*** 0.62 0.00001* 0.32 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   
% Latino in Chamber 0.02* 0.28 0.02 0.31 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
District Characteristics 
% Republican Vote 0.002 0.07 -0.003 -0.10 
  (0.001)   (0.00)   
% Below Poverty Level -0.004 -0.07 0.003 0.04 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   
% African-American 0.01*** 0.26 -0.004 -0.12 
  (0.003)   (0.01)   
% Latino 0.003 0.12 0.001 0.05 
  (0.003)   (0.00)   
Population Change, '00-'06 0.003 0.20 -0.01 -0.26 
  (0.006)   (0.01)   
Legislator Characteristics 
Republican -0.07 -0.03 0.15* 0.06 
  (0.05)   (0.07)   
Senator 0.59*** 0.23 0.28 0.11 
  (0.16)   (0.23)   
Leadership -0.26 -0.10 -0.22 -0.08 
  (0.14)   (0.12)   
Female 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.06)   (0.06)   
African American -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.01 
  (0.12)   (0.14)   
Latino 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.002 
  (0.13)   (0.15)   
Constant -1.65   -0.85   
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  (0.70)*   (0.76)   
N = 4019   4044   
Wald Chi Squared 125.09   54.15   
Prob> Chi Squared 0.0000   0.0000   
Pseudo R2= 0.1301   0.0391   
Notes: All p values are one-tailed. Predicted probabilities calculated from raising an 
independent variables minimum value to its maximum value while holding other 
independent variables at their mean values.  * ≤ 0.05; ** ≤ 0.01; *** ≤ 0.001. 
 
than were those from chambers with Latinos serving that enact the fewest number of 
bills.  
In terms of district- and personal-level characteristics, legislators in the most 
Republican districts were 8% less likely to have restrictive immigration policy referred to 
committees on which they served than were those that represented the most Democratic 
districts. Republican legislators were 4% more likely to have restrictive immigration 
legislation referred to committees on which they served—6% more likely in chambers in 
which Latinos served—than were Democratic legislators, senators were 9% more likely 
to have restrictive immigration policy referred to committees on which they served than 
were members of lower chambers, and those in leadership where 8% less likely to have 
restrictive immigration legislation referred to their committees than were those not in 
leadership.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
Studies of state legislative policymaking have often focused on the full makeup of the 
legislature in terms of gender, party, ethnicity, race, but those that serve on committees 
have a disproportionate influence on the small percentage of legislation that advances 
from the introduction stage to the floor vote. And, at least in the state immigration policy 
realm, the vast majority of those that advance, are passed in floor vote. Bill referral in the 
past has been used to assess party power (for example, see Krehbiel 1993). Member 
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participation in committees has been used to gauge legislators' descriptive and 
substantive representation of minority group interests in committee. However, the ethnic 
and racial composition of committees should, in theory, impact the policy that moves to 
the floor and onward to enactment. Thus, studying the ethnic and racial composition of 
the committees that work on legislation can tell us whether legislators from specific 
ethnic or racial groups have the opportunity to descriptively and substantively represent 
their ascriptive group. Past literature has found that legislators who are members of ethnic 
and racial groups tend to act for those group interests, even controlling for constituency, 
ideological, and party influences. For these reasons, it is essential to analyze the 
composition of the committees to which these bills are sent. 
 What does it tell us that the composition of the committees to which immigration 
bills are referred differs from the legislatures in general? For immigration bills, these 
findings show that the committees to which expansive bills are referred are more likely to 
be composed of Democratic legislators from more liberal states serving in more 
professionalized legislatures containing higher percentages of Latino legislators, and 
representing districts that had seen large, positive population change. The hypotheses 
suggest that these referred expansive immigration bills may therefore be pulled in a more 
liberal, pro-Latino direction than that represented in the state legislatures as a whole. The 
population change finding suggests that these legislators are under pressure to integrate 
these new arrivals through expansive immigration policy. Legislators on the committees 
to which restrictive immigration policy was referred were more likely to be Republicans 
from legislatures with a high percentage of Latino legislators, who represent more liberal 
districts, a profile that hints at ideological moderation.  
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 This chapter examined the composition of the committees to which state 
immigration policy is referred. Though overshadowed in the scholarly literature and in 
terms of public transparency by both the sponsorship and floor voting stages of the 
legislative policymaking process, what happens in committee largely determines the fate 
of legislation, particularly in when passage from committee generally assures passage on 
the chamber floor. Committee members therefore have considerable influence over what 
type of policy a state enacts. There has so far been little attention to how committee 
composition influences the outcome of public policy. This chapter initiates such a 
discussion by comparing the composition of the committees to which state immigration 
policy is referred in relation to the composition of the chamber at large.  
 In terms of the study of descriptive and substantive representation of Latino 
interests, the main emphasis of the broader study of which this chapter is a part, 
committees to which both types of immigration bills are referred are not significantly 
different from state legislatures as a whole in terms of legislators' personal ethnic or racial 
characteristics. As committee assignment is largely a reflection of legislator preference, 
this suggests that Latino legislators are not disproportionately selecting committees to 
which Latino interest area legislation is referred. Though this seems to fly in the face of 
previous research that found that minority group legislators are more likely to choose to 
serve on committees that are likely to oversee legislation that concerns the ethnic, racial, 
or gender group that they descriptively represent, it must be kept in mind how broadly 
immigration policy ranges across the legislative spectrum. Rather than selecting specific 
committees theorized to oversee a large percentage of legislation of disproportionate 
import to a specific racial, ethnic, or gender group then count the number of legislators 
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with those ascriptive characteristics that serve on those committees in comparison to on 
other committees, I have followed the legislation itself to determine the characteristics of 
legislators' committee oversight. Doing so provides a much fuller picture of which 
legislators had an oversized role in determining the fate of immigration policy that 
disproportionately impacts Latinos. Surprisingly, expansive immigration policy was not 
steered toward committees on which Latino state legislators served, a finding that may be 
taken to reflect that Latino legislators' behavior on expansive immigration policy is 
mostly symbolic, were such a result found in terms of Latino legislators' introduction of 
such policy in Chapter 2. This chapter's findings suggest that Latino legislators had as 
equal an opportunity as did non-Latino legislators to impact state immigration policy in 
committee, as least when their potential impact is measured in terms of committee 
composition. Further analysis of whether Latino legislators were as likely as non-Latino 
legislators to be chairs of these committees or to serve in the majority party in these 
committees is warranted. 
 This chapter examined the composition of legislative committees to which state 
immigration legislation was referred in 2007 to draw conclusions about state legislators' 
descriptive and substantive representation of Latino interests in committee. It is the first 
scholarship to study such a broad swath of state legislative committees, and to focus on 
the impact that committee ethnic and racial composition may have on legislative 
outcomes. The succeeding chapter will examine how state legislators vote on their 




Chapter 4: Analyzing Representation of Latino Interests 
through Legislative Roll-Call Voting on State Immigration 
Legislation 
Legislative floor action occupies the last legislative step in the policymaking process, and 
one that determines whether a bill will advance to the executive for signature into law or 
veto. Legislator behavior at the roll-call voting stage faces different pressures than those 
that influence legislator behavior at earlier stages of the policymaking process. Whereas 
state legislators at the sponsorship stages of the policy process may be motivated 
predominantly by district- and personal-level influences, legislative roll-call voting is 
linked in past political science scholarship with legislator reaction to party pressures (see, 
for example, Cox and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich 1995; Rohde 1991; but see Krehbiel 
1993). Roll-call voting therefore is a policymaking stage that offers a distinct arena in 
which to analyze legislators' reaction to unique pressures. 
 Indeed, recent research has found that party- and district-pressures prove 
influential in state legislators' roll-call voting behavior on all (Casellas 2011) and on only 
Latino-interest legislation (Rouse 2013), while finding no influence for personal-level 
characteristics. The uneven dispersal of immigration nationwide (Frey 2006; McConnell 
2008; Passel and Cohn 2011) has made immigration policy more salient in specific states 
and in specific districts. Legislators respond to the interaction between their state and 
districts' economic and demographic abilities to handle the strength of the immigration 
flow with targeted legislative policy solutions. While prior research has found that 
enacted state public policy does ultimately represent a state's collective ideology 
(Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1995), it is individual legislators, held accountable by 
district electoral politics, who vote on state immigration policy. Robust research shows 
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that legislators respond primarily to re-elective motives (Mayhew 1974). While studies of 
state legislative roll-call voting acknowledge this motivation, many also test for personal-
level motivations in legislators' roll-call voting behavior. Findings have been mixed on 
the influence of state legislators' gender, race, and ethnicity on their voting behavior 
(Swers 1998; 2002; Norton 1999; Welch 1985; Barnello 2001; Hogan 2008; Vega and 
Firestone 1995; Tate 2004; Swain 2006; Haynie 2001; Grose 2005; Barrett 1995; Rocca, 
Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Kerr and Miller 1997; Preuhs and Juenke 2011; Casellas 
2010; Rouse 2013). The immigration policy response to state-, district-, and personal-
level pressures has been two types of immigration legislation: that which expands or that 
which restricts government protection and services to undocumented immigrants.  
 The state legislative roll-call voting and the state immigration policy adoption 
literature has regularly tested hypotheses of the effect of the ethnic and ideological 
composition of a legislator's constituency as well as their personal-level factors like a 
legislator's gender, ethnicity, and race have on state legislators' roll-call voting behavior 
on state immigration policy. This study is novel from previous studies in both its 
substantive focus and in the data it employs. It is the first work of state legislative roll-
call voting to examine the state immigration policy context, to state legislator behavior 
across the full population of state legislators, and to examine state legislators' collective 
representation of state needs. 
Legislative Roll-Call Voting 
Political scientists have conducted extensive research into legislators' roll-call voting 
behavior. These studies have measured the impact of legislators' ideology, party, and 
constituency on their roll-call voting in both Congress (see, for example, Kingdon 1989; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1985; 1991; 1997; Snyder and Groseclose 2000) and state 
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legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Wright and Schaffner 2002; Jenkins 2006). More 
recently, studies at both national and sub-national levels have examined and found 
significant the influence of legislators' personal characteristics such as gender (Swers 
1998; 2002; Norton 1999; Welch 1985; Barnello 2001; Hogan 2008; Vega and Firestone 
1995), race (Tate 2004; Swain 2006; Haynie 2001; Grose 2005; Barrett 1995), and 
ethnicity (Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Kerr and Miller 1997; Preuhs and Juenke 
2011; Casellas 2010; Rouse 2013) on their roll-call voting behavior.  
 Critics of the use of roll-call votes to gauge legislator behavior note that 
legislators' preferences are constrained to but three choices at the roll-call vote stage—an 
aye or nay vote or an abstention—and that while these choices may capture the direction 
of legislators' preferences, they do not capture their intensity (Highton and Rocca 2005). 
Recent scholarship has branched out to study legislative behavior at the sponsorship 
(Schiller 1995; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Barnello and Bratton 2007), cosponsorship 
(Koger 2003; Bratton and Rouse 2011), and committee (Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 2001; 
Rouse 2013) stages of the policymaking process to better assess legislator behavior in 
arenas when they are not presented with the direct yes-or-no question that the roll-call 
posits. However, focusing on legislators' roll-call voting behavior remains important for 
three reasons.  
 First, the legislative floor is the only stage in the policymaking process where all 
members of the legislative chamber have equal access and ability to formally act on a 
bill. These actions are visible through members' recorded roll-call votes. Whereas 
analyzing state legislator sponsorship and committee behavior on state immigration 
policy provides important clues about the policy preferences of the state legislators with 
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the most interest in the immigration policy arena, analyzing legislator behavior on state 
immigration policy through roll-call votes is important because doing so provides 
information on how state legislators as a whole behave in response to state immigration 
policy. Second, the roll-call vote stage of the policymaking process is important both 
substantively and in terms of substantive representation; legislators' votes at this final 
legislative stage of the policymaking process determine whether a bill will pass. Thus, 
roll-call voting provides a window into how legislators represent their district 
constituents and constituents of specific racial groups in a substantive manner. Third, the 
roll-call vote remains the most visible of the policymaking stages to constituents, who do 
not as closely follow the sponsorship and committee behavior of their representatives. 
The transparency of the roll-call vote makes it an ideal policymaking stage for the testing 
of constituency influence on legislative behavior.  
Roll-Call Voting and the Representation of Minority Groups 
Prior research has found that female (Thomas 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; and Swers 
2002; Reingold 2000), African-American (Tate 2004), and Latino (Bratton 2002; 
Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000) legislators do provide descriptive representation to members 
of their own group through their sponsorship activity and through their vote at the floor 
vote stage (Swers 1998; 2002; Norton 1999; Welch 1985; Barnello 2001; Hogan 2008; 
Vega and Firestone 1995; Tate 2004; Swain 2006; Haynie 2001; Grose 2005; Barrett 
1995; Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Kerr and Miller 1997; Preuhs and Juenke 
2011; Casellas 2010; Rouse 2013). Additionally, the extant literature has found relatively 
robust the impact of having Latino constituents on legislators' substantive representation 
of Latinos (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Casellas 2010). However, analysis of the link 
between the descriptive representation of Latino interests by Latino legislators finds more 
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mixed results, with Hero and Tolbert (1995), Casellas (2010), and Rouse (2013) finding 
no difference and Welch and Hibbing (1984) and Kerr and Miller (1997) finding 
significant difference in the descriptive representation of Latino constituents when 
represented by a Latino legislator.  
 Though both Rouse (2013) and Casellas (2010) argue that such a study is 
important to understanding the substantive representation of Latinos by their elected 
legislators, only Rouse (2013) has so far focused exclusively on the roll-call voting 
behavior of legislators on legislation that disproportionately affects Latinos. Her study of 
Latino representation compares Latino legislators' roll-call voting behavior on both 
general legislation and on that which she classifies as Latino interest legislation, finding 
little in the way of an effect for ethnicity on Latino voting behavior. This chapter 
specifically focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of state legislators on restrictive and 
expansive immigration policy, a policy issue area which disproportionately affects 
Latinos and upon which Latinos therefore might be expected to prove an "attentive 
public" (Arnold 1992). In doing so, it looks to add to the debate on both the descriptive 
representation of Latinos by Latino representatives and the substantive representation of 
Latinos by legislators of other minority groups in general as studied by Hero and Tolbert 
(1995), Casellas (2010), Welch and Hibbing (1984) and Kerr and Miller (1997), and on 
Latino and other minority legislators' representation of Latinos within a specifically 
Latino-oriented policy arena (Rouse 2013). By analyzing the roll-call voting behavior of 
legislators across a broader array of states than that previously assessed, the results of this 
chapter should be more broadly generalizable of legislators' descriptive and substantive 
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representation of Latino policy interests than have been the results of previous studies.
31
 
Methodological Considerations for Studying Roll-Call Votes 
Conducting a multivariate analysis on state legislators' voting behavior carries with it a 
number of methodological pitfalls. Most legislative research on legislators' roll-call 
voting behavior has attempted to measure whether constituents' ideology is reflected in 
their legislators' roll-call votes and subsequently their states' enacted public policies. Two 
main studies have examined this linkage through estimation of state government ideology 
writ large (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1993; Berry et al. 1998), but this approach tells 
us little about individual legislators' roll-call behavior. The most prominently used 
method of examining this linkage through individual legislators' roll-call voting is to use 
roll-call votes to estimate legislators' ideal policy points. These studies have most often 
utilized as a dependent variable Poole and Rosenthal's (1985; 1991; 1997) Nominate 
scores of legislator ideal points. One limitation to these measures is that a legislator's 
ideal point exists within the legislative context of the chamber in which they serve, and 
cannot therefore be compared across chambers or legislatures; most studies that utilize 
these measures therefore examine Congress, though there have been attempts to apply 
this method to state legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal 2001). Doing so brings several 
logistical problems to the fore.  
 First, though interesting analysis of state legislators' roll-call voting behavior has 
occurred in studying one (Gerber and Lewis 2004; Kousser, Lewis, and Masket 2007; 
Bertelli and Richardson 2008) or from two to 20 state legislatures (Wright and Schaffner 
                                                 
31 
Prior studies of Latino legislators' descriptive representation of Latino interests may well be more 
representative of Latino legislators' behavior in other ways. Casellas (2011) examines Latino legislators' 
actions on all legislation in several sessions of the U.S. Congress as well in a few statehouses; Bratton 
(2006) examines a broader array of policy that corresponds to Latino interests than solely immigration 
policy, and does so in seven statehouses across multiple years; and Rouse (2013) examines a broader swath 
of Latino-interest legislation across six statehouses over three years. 
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2002; Casellas 2011; Rouse 2013; Jenkins 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; 
Preuhs and Juenke 2011), running models on each individual chamber across more than a 
handful of state legislative chambers is cumbersome and, in the end, not illustrative of 
state legislators' roll-call voting behavior in general. Second, gathering data on each roll-
call vote for each state legislator in each legislative chamber is an extremely time 
consuming and arduous task that had not been completed until Wright (2004) did so 
recently as part of the Representation in America’s Legislatures project. His compilation 
of state legislators' roll-call voting is a wonderful resource, and one that has formed the 
basis for important recent work like Preuhs and Juenke's (2011) determination of the 
ideological distance of Latino legislators from their legislative peers in 20 states, but it 
only contains data for the 1999-2000 state legislative session. Most recently, Shor, Berry, 
and McCarty (2010) collected state legislators' roll-call voting data to create a new 
measure of state legislator ideology that is comparable across chambers and across 
legislatures, but only for 11 states. They have since extended this measure to include 
aggregate state ideology scores for all 50 states for the years 1999-2009, but have not yet 
released the individual legislator ideal scores. 
 Others (Vega and Firestone 1995; Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Segal, Cameron, 
and Cover 1992) have operationalized interest group scores of legislators as the 
dependent variable as a proxy for Congressional legislators' personal preferences. But 
this measure also has its detractors, who note that interest groups do not score every vote, 
but only the votes that they are interested in, so the measure is not an accurate portrayal 
of a legislator's ideology, and that by analyzing the outcome of ideology, the vote itself, 
that these measures are not independent of the roll-call vote itself, a criticism that also 
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applies to measures like Nominate that are derived from roll-call votes themselves 
(Jackson and Kingdon 1992). Additionally, using interest group scores at the state level is 
particularly problematic because interest groups rarely score state legislative roll-call 
votes.  
 Finally, others (Miller and Stokes 1963; Jenkins 2006; 2008) have surveyed 
legislators to gauge their ideology, but uneven survey response rates mean that such an 
index is often not inclusive of all legislators. Each of these studies looks at either one 
(Vega and Firestone 1995; Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Segal, Cameron, and Cover 
1992; Miller and Stokes 1963) or only a handful (Jenkins 2006; 2008) of legislatures. 
 This chapter is less interested in determining the influence of ideology versus that 
of party than it is in determining the impact of racial and ethnic personal characteristics 
on voting behavior. Further, analyzing legislators' ideology becomes a more interesting 
exercise and yields more useful findings when assessing numerous roll-call votes across 
multiple policy areas; this study is moored to one policy area, and the ideological dualism 
inherent in the vote for each type of immigration policy itself may make it a solid proxy 
for legislator ideology, with more conservative members voting for more restrictive 
immigration legislation and more liberal members voting for more expansive 
immigration legislation. Therefore, measures of state legislators' ideology are less 
applicable to this study than is their actual voting behavior. 
Primary Hypotheses 
Debate exists on whether African Americans see Latino immigrants as an economic or 
political threat or as a potential minority political coalition partner to counter majority 
white political power (see, for example, Kaufmann 2003). African-American legislators 
have explained their opposition to anti-immigrant legislation by linking these measures to 
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past legislative attempts to limit African-American civil rights (see, for example, Bacon 
2012). African-American and Latino groups also share similar economic positions in 
American society, with group levels of poverty, education, and of the insured much more 
similar between African-Americans and Latinos than between either of these groups and 
whites (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). In certain contexts, African-American legislators have 
provided Latinos substantive representation (Bratton 2002; 2006). Such shared group 
characteristics may lead to shared type and direction of policymaking in African-
American legislators' substantive representation of Latino interests in immigration policy, 
an issue-area that particularly impacts Latinos.   
 Numerous studies have found that a legislator's gender, race, and ethnicity impact 
their legislative behavior, with many finding that these personal characteristics go beyond 
simple representation of constituency to provide descriptive or substantive representation 
of a group (Haynie 2001; Swers 2002). Latino legislators are more likely to introduce and 
pursue legislation beneficial to immigrant populations—to provide descriptive 
representation to Latino interests—than are non-Latino legislators (Bratton 2002; 
Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000). Legislators are also known to rely on the expertise of their 
colleagues in taking voting cues (Kingdon 1989); Latino legislators may therefore be 
accorded a degree of deference as experts on immigration issues, leading to higher rates 
of enactment of immigration bills on which Latino legislators work. There may also be a 
constituency tie in. Latinos consistently rank immigration higher as an important issue 
than do members of other racial and ethnic groups, and Latinos are more likely to favor 
either expanding or keeping immigration at the same levels than are other racial or ethnic 
groups (see, for example, de le Garza 2004). Immigration policy, therefore, is the type of 
92 
 
policy about which “attentive publics,” those most affected by the law—in this case 
Latino constituents—would be concerned (Arnold 1992).  
 The largely Latino composition of the recent wave of immigration, a stark 
difference from previous, primarily white immigrant waves, makes race and ethnicity a 
factor in legislators' immigration policy responses. The distinct ethnic character of this 
immigrant wave may stoke native hostility that increases with the size of the immigrant 
group (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005; Rocha and Espino 2009). Rapid shifts in a 
district's demographic composition may signal a large immigration influx. Hopkins 
(2010) finds that rapid increases in a locale's ethnic diversity increases natives' hostile 
political attitudes toward immigrants, and the probability of that locale passing restrictive 
immigration legislation. Boushey and Luedtke (2011) find a similar relationship at the 
state level, with states with recent increases in their foreign-born population more likely 
to pass restrictive immigration policy than states without such increases. 
 Party influence plays a much greater role at the roll-call vote stage than at the 
sponsorship stage of the legislative policymaking process. Whereas sponsorship is seen 
as largely an individual act independent of party influence (Schiller 1995), legislators rate 
highly the influence of party on their voting behavior (Kingdon 1989; Ray 1982; Songer 
et al. 1986). The roll-call voting stage of the policymaking process is the only stage to 
involve all members of a chamber, and not just those with greater substantive interest in 
the legislation who would be more likely to act on a piece of legislation at the 
sponsorship or committee stages. These less-knowledgeable or -interested members may 
well rely more heavily on party cues as voting heuristics than would their more-engaged 
peers, who have already likely sorted themselves into the proper party through their 
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policy interest in such a highly ideological policy issue. No work has broadly assessed 
party voting in state legislatures, instead focusing on party voting in a few state 
legislatures (Jenkins 2002; Wright and Schaffner 2002; Ray 1982; Witt and Moncrief 
1993). However, much recent research has found party to have the largest single 
influence on the descriptive representation of Latino constituents by Latino legislators 
(Rouse 2013; Casellas 2011). In this way, Latinos may be gaining representation not 
directly through Latino legislators, but indirectly through the Democratic Party, or, as 
Rouse (2013, 118) puts it: "the representation of Latinos appears to take place in a 
collective manner through legislative parties." 
 Parties actively work to restrict the choices legislators make at the floor vote stage 
to those that will not embarrass the party brand or politically endanger its individual 
members (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1994). As such, legislation that advances 
out of committee to the chamber floor has gained the majority party's imprimatur, and 
majority party members may be expected to vote for it at higher rates than non-majority 
party members (Jenkins 2002). 
Hypothesis 1: African-American state legislators will vote for a greater 
percentage of legislation that expands immigrant rights, and a lesser percentage of 
legislation that restricts immigrant rights, than will non-African-American 
legislators. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Latino legislators will vote for a greater percentage of legislation 
that expands immigrant rights and a lesser percentage of legislation that contracts 
immigrant rights than will non-Latino legislators.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Legislators representing districts with rapid population increases 
will vote for a greater percentage of restrictive immigration bills and a lesser 
percentage of expansive immigration bills than will legislators representing 
districts with less growth or a net exodus of residents.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Republican legislators will vote for a greater percentage of state 
immigration legislation that restricts and a lesser percentage of immigration 
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legislation that expands immigrant rights than will Democratic legislators.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Majority-party members will vote for a greater percentage of 
immigration legislation of both types than will minority-party members. 
 
Control Measures 
A number of control variables are also included to account for legislator characteristics 
extemporaneous from this chapter’s focus on state legislators’ roles descriptively and 
substantively representing minority groups through their floor voting behavior. Briefly, 
legislators from states with a more conservative citizen ideology are expected to vote for 
a higher percentage of restrictive immigration policies, while those from states with a 
more liberal citizenry are expected to vote for a higher percentage of expansive policies, 
and those that represent the most partisan Republican districts will vote for a higher 
percentage of restrictive and a lower percentage of expansive immigration policy than 
will those from more moderate or from the most partisan Democratic districts. Gender 
may also play a role, as female legislators tend to be more liberal than male legislators on 
social welfare issues (Barrett 1995; Poggione 2004) and on issues related to African-
American interests (Bratton and Haynie 1999). Finally, while findings have been 
relatively clear that gender impacts the number and topic of bills legislators sponsor 
(Thomas 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 2002), it has been more mixed on the 
impact of gender on legislators' roll-call voting behavior. Some scholars find significant 
differences between the roll-call voting behavior of male and female legislators on 
women's issues with female legislators voting more liberal (Swers 1998; 2002; Hogan 
2008; Welch 1985; Barrett 1995; Poggione 2004), while others find no such difference 
(Barnello 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997). Policy issues related to women, 
children, and the family are most likely to be associated with the Democratic Party or a 
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liberal ideology (Reingold 2000), and female legislators have been found to be more 
liberal than male legislators on social welfare issues (Barrett 1995; Poggione 2004), and 
on issues related to African-American interests (Bratton and Haynie 1999). This greater 
female policy liberalism may also extend to female legislators' substantive representation 
of Latinos on the social welfare issues relating to immigration. Female legislators may 
therefore offer substantive representation to Latinos on immigration policy by voting to 
enact a higher percentage of expansive immigration policy than their male counterparts. 
However, considerable research contradicts these expectations specifically on women's 
attitudes on immigration policy, finding that women are generally more favorable to 
restrictive immigration policy than are men (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 
1993; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Burns and Gimpel 2000). This discrepancy in 
the research is one important reason to control for the effects of gender on legislators' 
actions on immigration policy. Immigration is also an economic issue, with legislators 
from states with higher unemployment rates and higher levels of district poverty 
expected to vote for a higher percentage of restrictive immigration policy to prevent more 
surplus labor than those from states with lower levels of unemployment or representing 
districts with lower levels of poverty. Legislators residing in states on the U.S. border are 
expected to vote for a higher percentage of both types of immigration than are legislators 
in states in the interior. Legislators who work in more professionalized legislatures and 
those with a history of enacting more bills are expected to vote for a higher percentage 
of immigration legislation (Monogan 2010) of both types than are legislators who work 
in less professionalized legislatures or those that have a history of enacting fewer bills. 




Data and Methodology 
This study relies on the MPI/NYU coding of expansive and restrictive immigration 
legislation across the 40 states that voted on such measures in 2007 to analyze state 
legislator roll-call voting behavior.
32
 A total of 129 state immigration policy bills that fit 
this coding (77 expansive and 52 restrictive immigration bills) received recorded floor 
votes in state legislatures in 2007. 
Dependent Variables 
In light of the current lack of a measure of state legislators' roll-call votes comparable 
across state legislatures and across state legislative chambers as discussed above, I have 
operationalized a measure of state legislators' votes for immigration legislation of both 
types as the dependent variable. The dependent variable for the OLS multivariate 
regression models displayed in Table 4.6 is legislators' percentage of yes votes on each 
type of bill.  
Independent Variables 
Several independent variables test for individual-, district-, and state- and institutional-
level influences on state legislative roll-call voting on immigration legislation. 
Individual-level variables, including each legislator's party, whether they were in the 
majority party, leadership position, chamber, race, and gender, were gathered from state 
legislature websites. Latino ethnicity was derived from the Directory of Latino Elected 
Officials, 2007, available from the National Association of Latino Elected Officials 
(NALEO) Educational Fund. District-level demographic data, including percentages of 
Latinos, African Americans, households below the poverty level, the rate of each district's 
population change from 2000-2006, and the percentage vote for the Republican candidate 
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  See note 22. 
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in each district's most recent state legislative election,
33
 were all compiled from the 2006 
Almanac of State Legislative Elections (Lilley et al. 2007). State-level variables include a 
state's unemployment rate, degree of state legislative professionalization (Squire 2007),
34
 
citizen ideology (Berry et al. 2010), percent Latino in each state legislative chamber 
(NALEO), and whether a state sat on the U.S. foreign border (dichotomous). 
 Two different multivariate models were run on the effects of state- and 
institutional-, district-, and individual-level characteristics on state legislative roll-call 
voting on immigration legislation in 2007. The primary unit of analysis is the legislator. 
Both models, displayed in Table 4.6, utilize a different dependent variable to examine the 
percentage of expansive and restrictive immigration bills for which each legislator voted. 
Because the data for each of the models are gathered for individual- and also for state-
level variables, the distribution of state-level variables is not independent among 
legislators, but rather clusters. In light of the clustered nature of the data used in this 




Two important considerations must be noted when analyzing state legislative roll-call 
votes. First, the vast majority of bills that make it to the floor pass. Of 345 total 
immigration bills that made it to the floor in a chamber of a state legislature in 2007, 339 
(98.26%) passed the chamber. Of the 296 immigration bills that made it to a recorded 
floor vote in a chamber in 40 states in 2007,
36
 only six (2.03%) were defeated. Individual 
legislator roll-call votes showed little dissent as well; 110 (37.16%) of the 296 
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  See note 16. 
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  See note 18.  
36
  Immigration bills were voted on in the House chambers of 36 states, and in the Senate chambers 
of 33 states. 
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immigration bills receiving recorded floor votes garnered unanimous aye votes. This low 
level of dissent can stem from the power of the majority party to act as a cartel in 
weeding out unsanctioned legislation in committee, bringing only the bills that they know 
will pass (Cox and McCubbins 2004). It also speaks to the trust that individual members 
have in the specialization crystallized in the legislative committee process, wherein 
committees containing legislators well-versed in the topic of the legislation are given 
deference by other legislators on the chamber floor (Shepsle and Weingast 1987).  
 Only two of the 129 bills that fit in the expanding/contracting dichotomy analyzed 
in this project were rejected (1.6% of all of these types of bills receiving floor votes) 
across all chambers that had recorded floor votes.
37
 Individual legislator assent was also 
very high on these bills, with 46 bills expanding immigrant rights passing a chamber 
unanimously (59.7% of all expanding legislation that received a recorded floor vote), and 
17 bills contracting immigrant rights passing a chamber unanimously (32.7% of all 
contracting legislation that received a recorded floor vote). Of the bills that fit the scope 
of this study, 77 bills in 25 states expanding and 52 bills in 21 states contracting 
immigrant rights received a recorded vote on a chamber floor in 34 state legislatures in 
2007.
38 
For a breakdown of the number of bills that were introduced and were enacted 
into law in each state, see Appendix A. 
 How representative of the average U.S. state were the states where legislators 
voted on expansive or restrictive immigration policy in 2007? Table 4.1 displays the 
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  Three bills that received recorded floor votes were omnibus bills that both contracted and 
expanded immigrant rights in three state legislatures. Texas, Tennessee, and South Carolina held recorded 




descriptive statistics for states that held recorded floor votes on each type of immigration 
legislation in comparison to the grouping of states that did not hold recorded floor votes 
on each type of immigration policy for the variables of primary interest in this study.
 
No 
difference between the means of states that voted on and those that did not vote on 
expansive immigration legislation achieved standard levels of statistical significance. The 
difference between those states that voted for restrictive immigration legislation and those 
that did not is statistically significant at standard accepted social science levels for three 
variables: population change from 2000-2006, state citizen ideology, and percent of 
Republican legislators. Comparing the descriptive statistics on these variables does lend 
support to the hypotheses offered, with states that have a more conservative citizen 
ideology, more Republican legislators in their state legislatures, and with greater 
population changes (Newman et al. 2012; Hopkins 2010) all more likely to vote on 
restrictive immigration measures. However, the point here is not to analyze these 
descriptive statistics for support for our hypotheses, but rather to determine whether our 
sample of state legislatures that held recorded floor votes on immigration bills in 2007 is 
representative of all state legislatures. These findings suggest that we can freely apply our 
findings of state legislator roll-call voting behavior on expansive immigration legislation 
to state legislators in general, but that we must be more careful in applying our findings 
on state legislator roll-call voting behavior on restrictive immigration to all state 
legislators in general. However, this study does analyze all state legislator roll-call voting 
on restrictive and expansive immigration legislation, so results from these analyses can 
readily be taken as representative of legislator voting behavior in this policy realm.  
 Moving to the individual-legislator level, expansive immigration legislation 
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received a floor vote in state legislatures containing 3,194 legislators in 2007; of these 
legislators, a vast majority, 3,068 (96.06%), voted yes on at least one of these bills. In fact 
in state House chambers, 80.17% of legislators voted for every one while only 4.41% of 
state House members did not vote for any of the expansive immigration bills brought to a 
recorded vote in their chamber, whereas 85.06% of state Senators voted for every one and 
only 2.91% of state Senators did not vote for any of the expansive immigration bills 
brought to a recorded vote in their chamber.  
 
 Personal-level variables impacted legislators' voting actions on state immigration 
legislation, at least when assessing the relationship between voting for these measures 
through bivariate analysis as shown in Tables 4.2-4.5. Table 4.2 compares Latino, 
African-American, female, members in the upper chamber, Republican, and majority-
party legislators' votes for expansive and restrictive immigration legislation with these 









of Means p 
value
State and Legislature 
Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 4.35 4.24 4.53 0.29 4.27 4.46 0.50
Citizen Ideology 58.42 61.01 55.97 0.27 51.79 63.62 0.01
Legislative Professionalism 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.54 0.17 0.19 0.49
On the US Border 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.69 0.38 0.25 0.34
Total Bill Enactments 681.96 616.52 741.96 0.61 488.19 820.29 0.18
District Characteristics
% Below Poverty 12.60 12.72 12.54 0.84 12.20 12.95 0.41
% African-American 10.30 10.23 10.62 0.89 9.05 11.45 0.39
% Latino 9.56 11.90 7.20 0.10 10.71 8.77 0.50
Population Change, '00-'06 5.96 6.81 5.18 0.28 8.40 4.23 0.005
Legislator Characteristics
Republican 46.31 44.16 48.56 0.29 53.31 41.07 0.002
Female 23.27 23.59 22.94 0.76 24.11 22.64 0.49
African American 7.71 7.22 8.22 0.65 6.40 8.70 0.30
Latino 3.58 5.13 1.97 0.13 3.61 3.56 0.98
N = 50 25 24 21 28
Table 4.1. Comparison between States that Held and did not Hold Recorded Floor Votes on Expansive or 
Restrictive Immigration Legislation, 2007
Expansive Legislation Restrictive Legislation
Notes: Difference of means test is two-tailed to determine whether we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in the means of the variables. Nebraska is excluded due to its non-partisan legislature.
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groups' overall representation in state legislatures. Table 4.3 shows the percentages of 
each of these groupings who voted for at least one expansive or one restrictive 
immigration bill that reached the floor in state legislatures in 2007; the high percentages 
voting for each type of legislation in each group show in part the high level of assent on 
bills that reach the floor in state legislatures. Table 4.4 shows the average number of votes 
for each type of immigration bill by members of these groupings, which gives a better 
indication than does the simple dichotomous variable analyzed in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 of 
the variability in the intensity of group members' support for these measures. Table 4.5 
displays the average percentage of votes for each type of immigration bill by members of 
these groupings, which better accounts for the opportunities each legislator had to vote on 
each type of bill than does the simple count variables analyzed in Table 4.4. Assessing 
these statistics overall, African-American, female, majority party members, and members 
in the upper chamber all supported expansive immigration legislation at rates greater than 
the average legislator, while African-American legislators supported restrictive 
immigration at much lower rates than did the average legislator. Republican legislators 
supported expansive immigration legislation at rates lower than did Democrats while 
supporting restrictive immigration legislation at rates higher than did Democrats. 
Senators, and majority-party and, surprisingly, female legislators generally voted at 
higher rates for legislation of both types.  
 Perhaps the most interesting finding of these bivariate analyses pertains to Latino 
support of expansive immigration policy. Latino legislators show high levels of intensity 
of support for expansive immigration legislation when compared to the average legislator 
as evident in their high average number of votes for expansive immigration bills (Table 
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4.4), yet the average percentage of votes Latino legislators cast for expansive 
immigration legislation was lower than that of the average member. Though these simply 
summary statistics provide greater insight into the voting behavior of these groups on 
state immigration legislation and generate support for some of the hypotheses posited, 
multivariate analysis is necessary to control for the effect of each covariant on state 
legislator voting behavior. 
 The OLS regression model results shown in Table 4.6, which control for the 
influence of all other variables, offer further support for some of the hypotheses. In this 
table, I have run two separate models on the voting behavior of state legislators on 
expansive and restrictive immigration policy: one model on all state legislative chambers 
that had recorded floor votes on these measures, and one on only those chambers in 
which Latino state legislators served. These latter models should provide a clearer view 
of Latino state legislator behavior on immigration policy than would analyzing chambers 
without Latinos serving therein. Analyzing only those variables that achieved standard 
social science levels of statistical significance, for expansive immigration legislation, 
legislative professionalism and legislators' gender proved statistically significant 
influences on legislators' roll-call votes, but only the coefficient for legislators' gender 
was in the direction hypothesized. Female legislators' percentage voting for expansive 
immigration legislation was two percentage points higher than that of their male 
colleagues. This finding does not prove significant when looking only at state legislative 
chambers in which Latinos served. In these latter legislative chambers only, Republican 
legislators were 11 percentage points less likely to vote for expansive immigration 
measures than were Democratic legislators. The percentage of Latinos in a legislator's 
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district also becomes statistically significant in this model, but the coefficient indicates 











All Legislators 2.50 1.70
Republican 2.21 1.72





African American 3.18 1.39
Table 4.4. Average Number of Yes Votes by Legislators from Each Grouping on 
Each Type of Immigration Bill, 2007
Independent Variables Expansive Restrictive
Vote For Vote For
Majority Party Member 96.77 82.02
All Legislators 96.06 78.84
Senate 97.01 87.73
Republican 95.13 80.54
African American 97.61 71.95
Female 96.98 79.60
Vote For Vote For
% %
Latino 94.61 78.89
Majority Party Member 62.77 58.65
Table 4.3. Percentage of Each Group Who Voted for at Least One of Each Type of 
Immigration Bill, 2007
Independent Variables Expansive Restrictive
Senate 30.68 29.32
Republican 43.43 57.02





Table 4.2. Percentage of Votes on Each Type of Immigration Bill Cast by Legislators in Each 
Group
Independent Variables Expansive Restrictive




 The variables that proved significant for voting for restrictive immigration 
legislation differed from those for voting for expansive immigration legislation, 
suggesting that these policies are not two sides of the same coin. The district 
characteristic for percentage of Latinos and the personal legislator characteristics of party 
leadership, majority party membership, gender, and Latino ethnicity achieved standard 
social science levels of statistical significance. Of these, the coefficients for gender and 
district percentage Latino were in the opposite direction of that hypothesized, with female 
state legislators voting for a higher percentage of restrictive immigration legislation than 
did their male colleagues, a finding that does not hold when only examining chambers in 
which Latino legislators served, and with those representing districts with a higher 
percentage of Latinos also more likely to vote for restrictive immigration legislation than 
their peers who represent districts with a lower percentage of Latinos. Membership in the 
majority party increased the vote for restrictive immigration bills as hypothesized, and by 
a substantively significant 14 percentage—15 percentage points in legislative chambers 
in which Latinos served—over that of minority party members. Most important for this 
study, Latino legislators were a substantively significant 15 percentage points less likely, 
as hypothesized, to vote for restrictive immigration policy than were non-Latino 
Majority Party Member 92.62 66.14
All Legislators 90.38 59.87
Senate 92.21 61.29
Republican 86.47 62.06
African American 93.72 55.87
Female 91.22 60.99
Vote For Vote For
% %
Latino 90.13 42.90
Table 4.5. Average Percentage of Yes Votes Cast for Each Type of Immigration 
Policy by Each Legislator Group
Independent Variables Expansive Restrictive
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legislators, or 11 percentage points less when only looking at legislative chambers in 
which Latino legislators served. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Legislator roll-call voting on immigration bills that expand immigrant rights differs from 
legislator roll-call voting on immigration bills that restrict immigrant rights. This 
difference is an important one, and one that is missed by the past research on state 
immigration legislation that conjoins expansive and restrictive immigration policy into 
one measure (Monogan 2010). These policies are not simply two sides of the same coin, 
but rather different coins altogether, with some legislators voting for some bills that 
restrict and some bills that expand immigrant rights. There are two explanations for this, 
one based on the legislation, and one on individual legislators. First, this finding may 
belie that some of these policies are not quite as clearly drawn between expansion and 
restriction of immigrant rights as their coding typology might indicate. Second, 
legislative behavior on immigration policy may be a great deal more complex than 
simply drawn typologies and hypotheses can capture. This complexity may be contingent 
upon policy area, with legislators holding, perhaps, a moral belief in the right of 
immigrants to a health care delivery system comparable to that offered U.S. citizens, but 
also that undocumented immigrants are in the country illegally and should be targeted by 
state law enforcement. More research into the passage of both types of state immigration 
policy within various policy realms is needed. 
 The lack of a number of findings of this study when compared to prior literature 
on state immigration policy is also important. State ideology influences state policy 













Unemployment Rate 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.09
(0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12)
Citizen Ideology -0.00 -0.003 -0.01 -0.0002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Legislative Professionalism -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
On U.S. Border -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.14)
Total Bill Enactments 0.00** -0.00002* -0.00 -0.00001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% Latino in Chamber -0.00 -0.001 -0.00 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
% Republican Vote 0.00 0.001 -0.00 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% Below Poverty Level 0.00 0.0001 -0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% African-American -0.00 0.001 -0.00 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% Latino 0.00 0.001* 0.01** 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population Change, '00-'06 0.00 0.001 0.00 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Republican -0.07 -0.11* 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Senator 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.11
(0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.13)
Leadership -0.01 -0.03 0.06* 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) -0.03
In Chamber Majority Party 0.03 0.05 0.14*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Female 0.02* 0.01 0.04* -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
African American 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.09
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09)
Latino 0.01 -0.0001 -0.15** -0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.98*** 1.02*** 0.57 0.61
(0.06) (0.14) (0.41) (0.37)
N = 3325 2346 2642 2149
R2= 0.1092 0.1391 0.1221 0.1528
Table 4.6. Influences on State Legislators' Voting Yes on Immigration Bill Floor 
Votes
Expansive Legislation Restrictive Legislation
Coefficient (Rob. SE) Coefficient (Rob. SE)
Notes: All p values are one-tailed except for those for variables representing whether a 
legislator is African American and the percentage African American of their district due to 
the contrasting hypotheses offered for these variables.





2009), but does not impact legislators' roll-call voting on either type of immigration 
policy. The size of a state's Latino population plays a predictive role in state enactment of 
both kinds of immigration policy (Sanchez et al. 2012) or of only expansive immigration 
policy (Chavez and Provine 2009), but the percentage of Latinos in a state legislative 
district is only influential on roll-call voting on restrictive immigration legislation, and 
here higher percentages of Latinos increase legislators' percentage vote for restrictive 
immigration legislation. Critical mass theory does not seem to factor in on the voting 
decisions of legislators on immigration policy as there was no significance for the 
percentage of Latino legislators in a state legislature for voting for either expansive or 
restrictive immigration policy, but this finding does give further evidence that Latino 
legislators are not the only legislators who substantively legislate in this policy arena that 
disproportionately impacts the Latino community. Additionally, this study finds no 
support at the roll-call voting stage for Hopkins' (2010) findings of the effects of rapid 
population growth on localities' immigration policy outcomes. Legislators from districts 
with large population increases did not vote differently on immigration legislation than 
did their colleagues in districts with a lesser increase or a decrease in population over 
several years. 
 The differences in these findings may seem somewhat surprising at first because, 
due to the incredibly high percentage of legislative passage of immigration bills that 
reach the roll-call vote stage, the current study's breadth of data is much more reflective 
of the range of bills studied through the policy adoption lens than would be examinations 
of state immigration policy at earlier stages of the policymaking process. Difference 
between these two populations does exist however, first because many immigration laws 
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were passed in only one legislative chamber or were vetoed by the governor and therefore 
were not enacted into law, and second because not every bill that passed a legislative 
chamber received a recorded roll-call vote. Of the 299 total state immigration bills that 
were passed into law, 256 (85.62%) received recorded roll-call votes. This study's main 
difference, however, is not in its examination of a slightly larger population of legislation 
than that studied in the state immigration policy adoption literature, but in its focus on a 
different level of analysis, individual legislators' actions, rather than the aggregation of 
those legislators' actions to the state level. In doing so, the current study provides a more 
robust picture of the state immigration policymaking process by allowing analysis of the 
effects of personal characteristics on legislator roll-call voting on immigration legislation. 
This focus yields important new findings on legislators' descriptive and substantive 
representation of the predominantly Latino immigrant population.  
 State immigration laws are often highly charged pieces of legislation with very 
real and painful impacts on immigrant populations. They can determine whether 
undocumented families must uproot from their adopted land and move to less hostile 
locales, whether families living paycheck to paycheck lose or gain essential state benefits, 
and whether individuals detained for what had a been a misdemeanor might be deported. 
One of, if not the largest fear among the undocumented community is of families being 
separated due to deportation, a fear 15-year old undocumented immigrant Juan Flores 
notes: "Oklahoma is closing all the doors because we are illegal. Work for my parents 
brings fear. They will not even let me go outside anymore. They are so scared someone is 
going to come take me” (Walker 2007). The finding that Latino legislators provide 
descriptive representation to Latinos through their dissent on restrictive immigration 
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policy is best understood in this context. Latino legislators descriptively represent Latino 
interests when those interests are most salient, that is, when they are threatened, but not, 
as the finding of lack of descriptive representation of Latino interests on expansive 
immigration legislation shows, in a subarena in which those interests are not threatened 
by rather proactively expanding. Communities under policy threat have been known to 
stimulate legislative policy response, as have smokers threatened by anti-smoking 
legislation and cigarette taxes (Green and Gerkin 1989) and gun owners threatened by 
gun control legislation (Wolpert and Gimpel 1998).   
 This chapter's finding of Latino legislators' descriptive representation of Latino 
interests does counter the findings of both Rouse (2013) and Casellas (2011), whose 
studies of roll-call voting behavior found that Latino legislators were no more likely to 
vote for Latino interests than were non-Latino members. To understand this discrepancy 
of findings, it is important to note how these previous studies differed methodologically 
from the current study. 
 The breadth of the issue areas addressed is one important difference between this 
and previous studies of Latino state legislators' roll-call voting behavior. Casellas (2011) 
examines all legislation that received a roll-call vote, while Rouse (2013) studies the 
difference between Latino legislators' roll-call vote on all legislation and on Latino-
interest issues, a policy area that includes immigration policy, but also legislation "aimed 
at improving healthcare services, bills addressing discrimination, more general education 
policies, and economic improvement initiatives for impoverished areas" (111). The 
current study focuses solely on state immigration legislation, and its finding of Latino 
legislators' descriptive representation of Latino interests emerges more specifically in the 
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policy subarena of restrictive immigration legislation. The narrowness of the policy 
subarena in which this finding occurs, and that it is not paired with a similar finding on 
expansive immigration policy, may also hold the key to resolving the discrepancy of this 
finding with that of the extant literature. Work that analyzes Latino descriptive 
representation by looking at Latino-interest legislation as if it were unidirectional in 
nature (Rouse 2013) may also miss the nuanced nature of this finding. Latino-interest 
policies, and particularly state immigration policy, can be bifurcated into policies that 
benefit and those that are detrimental to Latino interests, and not accounting for this 
nuance may lead to erroneous results of Latino descriptive representation. The findings 
from this chapter indicate that Latino descriptive representation does occur, but only 
when Latino interests are most salient, when Latino interests are threatened. Rouse's 
(2013) work also assessed a broader range of policy than does this dissertation; it may 
well be that these findings only hold for immigration policy, and disappear when other 
Latino-interest areas are examined. 
 The other important methodological distinction between the present study and 
prior studies lies in the included range of state legislatures. The present study analyzes 
roll-call voting on restrictive immigration legislation in every state that saw recorded roll-
call votes on this type of legislation in 2007, a total of 21 states (in 19 House chambers 
and in 18 Senate chambers). Rouse (2013) examined the recorded roll-call votes of state 
legislatures in both chambers of five states chosen both for their high percentage of 
Latino legislators and their high percentage of Latinos in the general population (Arizona, 
California, Florida, Texas, and New Mexico). Casellas (2011) restricts his study of Latino 
roll-call voting behavior in state legislatures to the Texas House and both chambers of the 
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Colorado and New Jersey legislatures. The discrepancy in these findings of Latino 
legislators' descriptive representation of Latino interests might lie in states with a high 
percentage of Latinos in the legislature who may not feel the need to offer direct 
descriptive representation to Latino constituents because, as Rouse notes, those interests 
are already being addressed in the legislature through the actions of the Democratic 
Party; however, judging from the insignificant results related to the percentage of Latino 
legislators in state legislatures and for the party variable for the restrictive immigration 
legislation model, this does not appear to be the case. Rather, it may be that Latino 
legislators in states with high percentages of Latino legislators that are not included in 
Rouse (2013) and Casellas' (2011) studies are descriptively representing Latino interests. 
The current study's expansive range of data is more representative of state legislators' 
roll-call voting behavior than are previous studies that have utilized a narrower set of 
states in different policy realms, meaning that its findings can be more confidently 
applied to state legislator roll-call voting behavior in general.  
 This study analyzed state legislator roll-call voting in the 33 states that held roll-
call votes on expansive or restrictive immigration legislation in 2007. While finding 
mixed results for female legislators' substantive representation of Latino interests, 
contrary to previous literature (Rouse 2013; Casellas 2011), it finds both little role for the 
influence of party on legislators' roll-call voting in the immigration policy realm and that 
Latino legislators descriptively represent Latino interests through their roll-call votes on 
restrictive immigration legislation when Latino interests are threatened. The finding of 
the influence of legislators' personal characteristics is important in our understanding of 
the representative tie between citizen, legislator, and public policy. In the state 
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immigration policy realm, at least, Latino interests are best served through the election of 
Latino legislators to state legislatures.  
 The roll-call voting stage is, however, but one of many in the public policymaking 
process, and critics note that while studying roll-call voting provides a unique stage to 
capture the direction of legislators' policy preferences, it does not capture its intensity as 
do other legislative stages. Many scholars (Rouse 2013; Bratton 2002; Bratton and Rouse 
2012) have also argued that other legislative policymaking stages are better reflection of 
legislators' descriptive representation of minority groups. To fully understanding the 
stories of state immigration policy and Latino representation in state legislatures, in 
addition to the roll-call voting stage one must also consider the sponsorship and 

















Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Legislators in all 50 states introduced a total of 1,562 bills related to immigration in 2007, 
the first year in which an immigration bill was introduced in every state legislature (see 
Appendix 1), and almost three times the number introduced in 2006. Forty-six states 
enacted into law a total of 240 immigration-related bills in 2007, more than triple the 84 
enacted in 32 states in 2006 (Hegen 2008). U.S. sub-national governments have gone 
down this legislative road before, most recently in the 1980s and early 1990s during 
which time they crafted legislation aimed at sending anti-immigrant, often nativist 
messages to the largely Latino immigrant populations. These state immigration policies 
have grave real-world effects on the largely Latino undocumented immigrant 
communities they target; they determine how the estimated 11.6 million undocumented 
immigrants living in the United States interact with state law enforcement, receive social, 
health, and educational services, and integrate with the state economy, and can influence 
undocumented immigrants' decision to migrate to or emigrate from a state (see, for 
example, PBS 2011).  
 This increase in state immigration policy is occurring in parallel to the marked 
increases in the percentage of the Latino population overall, its percentage of the voting 
electorate, and in the number of government positions held by Latinos at all levels of 
government over the past several decades. At the state level, Latinos have made 
impressive gains in state legislatures, even if these gains still lag behind the Latino 
percentage of the population in every state (see Appendix 1). This increase in Latino state 
legislators, however, does not necessarily translate into representation that has a 
substantive policy impact. By examining how Latino legislators represent Latino interests 
through state immigration policy, this dissertation addresses important questions of 
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representation in American democracy. Do ethnic personal characteristics and shared 
experiences influence how legislators behave within a policy area that disproportionately 
impacts members of that ethnicity? These questions are important, because without this 
descriptive representational tie, growth in the number of Latino legislators provides no 
significant benefit for Latino interests over that of electing non-Latino legislators. Several 
scholarly works (Bratton 2002; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Rouse 2013) have found that 
Latino legislators offer descriptive representation to Latino interests—that is, 
representation based on a common ethnic tie beyond that which can be attributed to 
constituency and party influences.  
 This dissertation examines state legislator behavior on immigration legislation 
that either expands or restricts immigrant rights to test the findings of prior literature on 
state immigration policy adoption and on the descriptive representational roles of Latino 
legislators. Previous state-level studies of state immigration policy have found state 
citizen ideology (Creek and Yoder 2012; Monogan 2010; Newman et al. 2012), 
partisanship (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2013), and the partisan lean of the 
legislature or of the governor (see, for example, Sanchez, Sanchez, and Ybarra 2012; 
Chavez and Provine 2009; Reich and Barth 2010) amongst the most powerful indicators 
of state immigration policy adoption. In contrast to the findings of the state immigration 
policy adoption literature, partisanship plays a real, but inconsistent role contextual to the 
legislative policy stage and the direction of the policy under consideration in determining 
legislator behavior on immigration policy. Republican legislators tend to use the bill 
introduction stage to set the policy agenda for restrictive state immigration policy, and are 
moderately more likely to serve on committees that see fewer expansive immigration 
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bills and that see a larger number of restrictive immigration bills. These findings may 
well bubble up into the partisanship seen at the state policy adoption stage. State citizen 
ideology had little impact on state legislator behavior on state immigration policy, but this 
may be due to the mismatch between the levels of constituency, with each state 
legislature responsive to their own differing district constituency for re-election, and not 
the state-level constituency. State district or legislator-level ideology data have been, until 
recently, nonexistent. Recent work (Shor and McCarty 2013) mapping individual state 
legislators ideology might well be used in future work to better measure the impact of 
state legislator ideology on state legislator behavior. 
 In contrast to the findings of the extant literature on descriptive representation, 
this dissertation finds that Latino legislators' representation of Latino interests is 
conditional on whether those interests are directly threatened. Whereas Latino legislative 
sponsorship behavior on state immigration policy of either type does not differ from that 
of non-Latino legislators, a finding that goes against that of prior literature (Bratton 2002; 
Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Rouse 2013) that found significant Latino descriptive 
representation of Latino interests at the agenda-setting stage of the legislative 
policymaking process, their behavior in not voting for such measures on chamber floors 
speaks to their descriptive representational role. Latino legislators here mirror the 
“second face of power” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962) in their descriptive representation of 
Latino issues by working to stop restrictive immigration policy from being enacted. 
 The differences between this dissertation's findings and that of prior literature may 
well flow from the differences between the scope of the data they examine. This 
dissertation is the first analysis of state legislator behavior on state immigration policy 
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and is therefore different from the previous work in this policy realm that has focused on 
policy adoption at the state level. In terms of its findings on Latino descriptive 
representation, two major differences emerge. First, this study analyzes a newly created 
database of state legislator behavior across the legislative policymaking process in 49 
states, whereas prior studies focused their attention on only a handful of states selected 
for their high percentages of Latino legislators, Latino residents, or both. This 
dissertation's expansive range of data—immigration policies across 49 states—is more 
representative of state legislators than are previous studies that have utilized a narrower 
set of states in different policy realms (see Appendix 2), meaning that its findings can be 
more confidently applied to state legislator sponsorship behavior in general. This study is 
the first to analyze state legislator sponsorship behavior among all state legislators.  
 Second, this dissertation's focus on state immigration policy differs from prior 
studies' analysis of a broader range of policy arenas that impact Latinos. The breadth of 
the issue areas addressed is one important difference between this and previous studies of 
Latino state legislators' behavior. Rouse (2013) studies the difference between Latino 
legislators' behavior on all legislation and on legislation related to Latino-interest issues, 
a policy area that includes immigration policy, but also legislation "aimed at improving 
healthcare services, bills addressing discrimination, more general education policies, and 
economic improvement initiatives for impoverished areas" (111). Rouse’s (2013) 
excellent research design wisely compares state legislator’s representational behavior on 
those issues thought to be the most salient to the Latino community—Latino-interest 
issues—with all other legislation. However, though this research design was a major step 
forward over that which examined Latino legislative behavior only on all legislation 
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(Casellas 2011), it did not examine the potential directional nuances of Latino-interest 
legislation. In contrast, this dissertation focuses solely on state immigration legislation. 
This dissertation's comparative narrowness of focus provides considerable payoff in that 
the standard typology for classifying state immigration policy accounts for its 
dichotomous nature: policy that either expands or restricts immigrant rights. The bi-
directional nature of this policy area allows for greater nuance in examining the 
descriptive representation of Latino legislators, with descriptive representation showing 
when Latino legislators take actions that further policy expanding immigrant rights or do 
not take or block policy that restricts immigrant rights. Previous studies therefore may 
well overstate Latino descriptive representation on Latino-interest legislation because 
they do not take into account that some legislation in this arena may be beneficial while 
other legislation may be inimical to Latino interests. It is also quite possible that these 
findings are salient for immigration policy, and that by expanding the range of policy that 
previous scholars have classified as Latino-interest that these findings disappear. 
 This dissertation finds that Latino legislators substantively represent Latino 
interests on immigration policy only when those interests are most threatened. 
Communities under policy threat have been known to stimulate legislative policy 
response, as have smokers threatened by anti-smoking legislation and cigarette taxes 
(Green and Gerkin 1989) and gun owners threatened by gun control legislation (Wolpert 
and Gimpel 1998). Issue salience has generally been used to describe the importance that 
the public pays to an issue-area (Wlezien 2005), and about which “attentive publics,” 
those most affected by the law, would be concerned (Arnold 1992). This dissertation's 
findings of Latino descriptive representation only to block state immigration policy that 
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restricts immigrant rights suggests that these attentive publics form amongst Latino 
constituents in opposition to passage of such bills, and that they pressure Latino 
legislators to kill such legislation. Lack of a finding for Latino descriptive representation 
for state immigration policy that expands immigrant rights suggests that these 
communities do not form to support—and therefore legislators do not feel pressure to 
fight for—the expansion of rights for the largely Latino immigrant community. This 
finding follows that of relatively recent research examining into the differing 
motivational attributes of threat and of opportunity, which finds threat the more likely to 
spur political action (Miller and Krosnick 2004). The finding of the importance of issue 
salience to legislator descriptive representation may well extend beyond representation of 
the Latino community to a broader discussion of what stokes legislator action on the 
behalf of an ethnic, racial, or underprivileged constituency, and future work on 
descriptive representation would do well to parse out the intended legislative impact on 
the studied ethnic or racial group to determine whether legislators’ descriptive 
representation is brought about through legislative threat. It may be that this is the only 
policy stimulus that earns a legislator’s response. Though issue salience has largely been 
examined in the context of the public’s opinion (Wlezien 2005), the representational tie 
between legislators and their constituency’s attentive publics makes the argument for 
consideration of issue salience in future models of legislator behavior.  
 This dissertation's findings indicate that future work should pay attention to the 
potential multi-directionality of purpose in certain policy areas. There may be further 
directional nuance to policies within policy arenas that can yield greater political insight 
that would be obtained from examination of these policies as if they were a unidirectional 
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mass. Studying policy areas where there is a clear bi-directionality in purpose allows the 
researcher to more accurately test theories of representation.  
 This dissertation also calls to attention the potential advantages of assessing state 
legislator behavior across a larger collection of states than that assessed by prior research 
in this field. Latino state legislator behavior in largely Latino states, where there are 
likely other Latino legislators to create a legislative mass capable of moving policy, may 
well differ from Latino legislators' actions when they have no such network of support. 
Preliminary analysis of the differences in legislator behavior in only those states 
examined by prior scholarship indicates that state legislator sponsorship behavior in those 
states differs from that of the full population of state legislators analyzed in this 
dissertation (Table 5.1). Analyzing a sample of legislators from fewer states chosen for 
their large Latino population and the high percentage of state legislators who are Latino 
might have led to the conclusion that Latino legislators provide descriptive representation 
to Latino interests on immigration policy that expands immigrant rights, a finding that 
disappears when analyzing the data used in this dissertation, which is  the full population 
of state legislators. Recent work (for example, Shor and McCarty 2013) has started to 
improve the quality and quantity of data that we have on state legislatures and legislators 
across all 50 states. Future work will do well to take advantage of these improving 
resources to continue this trend toward the inclusion of all state legislators in studies of 
state legislative behavior. Such work can enhance the theoretical insights advanced by 
earlier studies by using data from which we can draw insights that are generalizable 
across all state legislators. 
 Understanding how legislators behave on state immigration policy is important. 
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The states are offering up a variety of policy solutions in their struggle to cope with 
increasing numbers of largely poor, unskilled immigrants. State-, district-, and personal-
level factors impact state legislators’ behavior on state immigration policy. While no one 
factor uniformly influences state legislators’ behavior on the two types of state 
immigration policy examined here, this dissertation finds that while important, 
legislators’ partisanship and states’ citizens’ ideology are not as universally important in 
the formation of state immigration policy as the state immigration policy adoption 
literature finds. Finally, it offers a more nuanced look at Latino descriptive representation, 
finding that Latino legislators only offer descriptive representation on state immigration 
policy that restricts immigrant rights.  
The past several decades have seen marked increases in the percentage of the 
Latino population overall, its percentage of the voting electorate, and in the number of 
government positions held by Latinos at all levels of government. This increase in Latino 
state legislators, however, does not necessarily translate into representation that has a 
substantive policy impact. In terms of legislation that would expand the rights of the 
largely Latino immigrant community, Latino legislators offer no significant benefit for 
Latino interests over that of electing non-Latino legislators. It is only in protecting the 
already provided rights of this community that Latino legislators make a small difference. 
Understanding how these influences impact state legislator behavior gives us a more 





































Unemployment Rate -0.63** -4.75*** -1.06*** 2.80*** 0.21 -11.73*** -0.42* -6.30***
(0.29) (0.16) (0.43) (0.00) (0.20) (1.53) (0.23) (0.55)
Citizen Ideology 0.02* -0.06*** 0.04 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.31*** 0.02 -0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01)
Legislative Professionalism 0.03** -0.09*** 0.04*** -0.05** -0.03 -0.36*** -0.02 0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
On the US Border -0.70** 8.06*** 0.16 0.75*** -0.60 26.16*** 0.93** 1.41***
(0.38) (0.56) (0.51) (0.25) (0.37) (5.51) (0.52) (0.27)
Total Bill Introductions 0.00 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) '(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% Republican Vote -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Below Poverty Level -0.02 -0.00 -0.04* -0.06** -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
% African-American 0.01 -0.01*** 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
% Latino 0.03*** 0.02 0.00 0.02* 0.01 -0.11* -0.04 -1.25***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03) (0.41)
% Population Change, '00-'06 0.01 -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03** 0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Republican -0.27 0.58*** 0.06 -0.19 1.45*** 1.66*** 1.20*** 1.05**
(0.25) (0.17) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21) (0.52) (0.30) (0.52)
Senator 0.27** -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.22 -0.09 0.15 0.66***
(0.17) (0.21) (0.15) (0.32) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18)
Leadership 0.15 0.38 0.30 0.61 -0.05 -0.65 -0.15 0.76***
(0.15) (0.32) (0.28) (0.44) (0.27) (0.46) (0.33) (0.29)
Female 0.34*** 0.18 0.16 0.03 -0.07 -0.30 -0.03 0.44
(0.12) (0.21) (0.17) (0.29) (0.20) (0.28) (0.23) (0.30)
African American -0.24 -0.12 -0.32 0.38 -0.69 -1.18*** -1.00 0.01
(0.28) (0.18) (0.28) (0.43) (0.53) (0.09) (0.61) (1.13)
Latino 0.26 0.53* 0.68** 0.61* -0.48 0.17 -0.37 -1.25***
(0.44) (0.34) (0.35) (0.44) (0.67) (0.32) (0.60) -0.41
N = 7232 917 2141 793 7232 917 2141 793
6 Models are estimated controlling for clustering of standard errors by state.
State and Legislature Characteristics
District Characteristics
Legislator Characteristics
Expansive Immigration Legislation Restrictive Immigration Legislation
Coef. (Robust Std. Error)
6
Table 5.1. Negative Binomial Predictions for Influence of Legislators' State, District, and Personal Characteristics on Introduction 
of Expansive and Restrictive Immigration Legislation, 2007, by States used in Prior Research
5
Notes: All p-values are one tailed, except for African American and District % African American, which are two tailed due to the contrasting 
hypotheses offered, and Chamber, Leadership, and the Constant term, for which no directional hypotheses were put forth.       * ≤ .1; **≤ .05; 
***≤ .01
1 
States used in Yoder's (ND) analysis: All states and legislative chambers except for NE, which was excluded due to its nonpartisan 
legislators.
2
 States used in Barnello and Bratton's (1999) analysis: AR, CA, IL, MD, NC, NJ
3 
States used in Barnello and Bratton's (2007) analysis: AZ, AR, CA, CO, FL, IL, LA, MD, MI, MS, NJ, NM, NC, SC, TX
4 
States used in Rouse's (2013) analysis: AZ, CA, CO, IL, NM, TX
5
 Due to the limited number of cases, full models could not be estimated on the states used in Bratton's (2005) [CA, IL, MD] and (2006) [CA, 
FL, IL, TX] analyses.







Appendix A. Percent Latino Legislators, Introduced, and Passed Legislation by State and Legislative Typology, 2007
State Expanding Contracting
Introduced Passed Introduced Passed
Alabama 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0 5 0
Alaska 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 1 0
Arizona 29.6 18.9 18.3 20.0 3 0 4 0
Arkansas 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0 0 0
California 37.6 22.5 20.5 25.0 18 4 5 0
Colorado 20.7 5.0 4.6 5.7 1 1 5 3
Connecticut 13.4 3.2 4.0 0.0 8 1 5 0
Delaware 8.2 1.6 2.4 0.0 1 1 2 1
Florida 22.5 10.6 11.7 7.5 7 1 3 1
Georgia 8.8 1.3 1.7 0.0 0 0 3 1
Hawaii 8.9 1.3 0.0 4.0 15 7 0 0
Idaho 11.2 1.0 1.4 0.0 2 0 1 1
Illinois 15.8 6.0 6.8 5.1 4 2 1 0
Indiana 6 0.7 1.0 0.0 2 1 5 2
Iowa 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 0 2 0
Kansas 10.5 2.4 3.2 0.0 0 0 5 3
Kentucky 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 8 1 1 0
Louisiana 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
Maine 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 2 1
Maryland 8.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 8 4 3 0
Massachusetts 9.6 2.0 2.5 0.0 14 0 1 0
Michigan 4.4 2.0 1.8 2.6 0 0 17 1
Minnesota 4.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 17 3 4 0
Mississippi 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0 7 0
Missouri 3.5 0.5 0.6 0.0 4 0 12 0
Montana 2.9 0.7 1.0 0.0 2 1 7 1
Nebraska 9.2 2.0 N/A 2.0 1 0 1 1
Nevada 26.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 5 3 4 2
New Hampshire 2.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 1 1 1 0
New Jersey 17.7 4.9 7.5 0.0 6 0 0 0
New Mexico 46.3 39.3 42.9 33.3 5 1 3 0
New York 17.6 7.6 8.7 6.5 61 3 17 0
North Carolina 8.4 1.2 0.8 2.0 10 2 15 1
North Dakota 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 0 0
Ohio 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 0 1 0
Oklahoma 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 0 10 2
Oregon 11.7 1.1 1.7 0.0 8 2 3 0
Pennsylvania 5.7 0.4 0.5 0.0 2 0 4 0
12.4 2.7 2.7 2.6 9 2 8 0
South Carolina 5.1 0.6 0.8 0.0 7 0 13 1
South Dakota 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1 0
Tennessee 4.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 9 1 36 0
Texas 37.6 18.9 20.7 16.1 30 7 24 3
Utah 13 1.9 1.3 3.4 1 1 1 0
Vermont 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0 2 1
Virginia 7.9 0.7 1.0 0.0 12 5 10 0
Washington 11.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 4 1 5 1
West Virginia 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1 0
Wisconsin 5.9 0.8 1.0 0.0 1 0 0 0
Wyoming 8.9 2.2 3.3 0.0 0 0 1 0
Total 16.3 3.2 3.8 2.9 313 60 263 28


















Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
0.10 0.43 0 7 0.11 0.45 0 7
0.07 0.33 0 9 0.07 0.36 0 6
0.07 0.26 0 1 0.03 0.16 0 1
0.05 0.23 0 1 0.01 0.09 0 1
4.36 0.87 2.60 7.10 4.30 0.84 2.6 7.1
57.34 15.55 22.73 88.17 58.31 15.06 23.52 88.17
18.40 12.01 2.70 62.60 20.03 12.86 2.7 62.6
0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.49 0 1
3171.39 2893.66 486.00 16131.00 3762.83 3348.59 486 16131
45.97 30.06 0.00 100.00 45.86 30.81 0 100
15.27 7.30 1.50 52.10 14.11 7.16 1.5 87.3
10.91 17.02 0.00 92.20 10.85 16.47 0.0 92.2
8.71 13.46 0.00 98.00 11.59 15.80 0.3 98.0
5.23 9.95 -85.00 157.00 6.52 9.40 -17 157
Republican 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.50 0 1
Senator 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.37 0 1
Leadership 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0 1
Female 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0 1
African American 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.29 0 1





1=African American; 0=not. 
1=Hispanic; 0=not. (NALEO 2007).
Coding Info
Notes: All variables coded by author unless otherwise noted. * (Lilley et al. 2007).
Count. # of expansive bills a 
legislator sponsored.
Count. # of restrictive bills a 
legislator sponsored. 
1=sponsored and was enacted; 
0=did not sponsor or was not 
enacted
District % Latino
District Population Change, 2000-
2006
District % Hispanic, 2006.*
District % pop. change, 2000-2006.* 
1=Republican; 0=not Republican. 
District % Republican Vote, Most 
Recent Election
District % Below Poverty Level
District % African-American
% Republican vote in district in 
latest state legislative election for 
that seat. See note 9.*
District % below poverty, 2006.*  




Each state's legislative 
professionalism (Squire 2007).
1=on US border; 0=not.
# of bills and resolutions introduced 
in regular or special session in 




Each state's unemployment rate. 
U.S. BLS.
NOMINATE state citizen ideology. 
(Berry et al. 2012). 
# Introduced Contracting Legislation
Introduced Enacted Expanding 
Legislation
Introduced Enacted Contracting 
Legislation
1=sponsored and was enacted; 
0=did not sponsor or was not 
enacted
Legislators in All State Legislative Chambers Legislators in Chambers w/ Latino 
LegislatorsDependent Variables
# Introduced Expanding Legislation







Bratton and Haynie (1999) Negative 
binomial 
regression
AR, CA, IL, 
MD, NC, NJ




Bratton (2006) Negative 
binomial 
regression
CA, FL, IL, TX
Barnello and Bratton (2007) Negative 
binomial 
regression
AZ, AR, CA, 
CO, FL, IL, 
LA, MD, MI, 
MS, NJ, NM, 
NC, SC, TX
Rouse (2013), Chapter 3 Negative 
binomial 
regression
AZ, CA, CO, 
IL, NM, TX
Appendix C. List of Prominent Articles on State Legislative Sponsorship
Investigates the agenda-setting behavior 
of female and black state legislators, 
contrasting their success with that of 
white men in passing legislation on 
“black interest” and “women's interest” 
measures. Uses a six-state, three-year 
sample, to test a descriptive 
representation model in which group 
members (blacks and women) 
represent group interests above and 
beyond the extent motivated by 
constituency and party pressures. Find 
that blacks and women share a set of 
distinctive policy interests. 
Analyzes data from three state 
legislatures in four years, finding that 
even in extremely skewed state 
legislatures, women are generally more 
active than men in sponsoring 
legislation that focuses on women’s 
interests and that women are generally 
as successful as men in passing the 
legislation  that they sponsor.
Finds that Latino representatives in 
three of the four states studied sponsor 
more measures focusing on Latino 
interests, and that Latino 
representatives are more likely to serve 
on committees that are relatively likely 
to meet those interests. Also finds that 
Latino representatives are as 
successful as other legislators in 
passing the bills that they introduce. 
Explores the conditions under which 
men are likely to sponsor legislation in 
policy areas involving women’s issues 
and children’s issues in the upper and 
lower chambers of 15 state legislatures 
in 2001. Differences in sponsorship are 
relatively marked in the sponsorship of 
legislation that focuses on reproduction 
or other health issues particularly 
relevant to women.
Focuses on ethnic differences in 
agenda setting; specifically, the factors 
that influence the sponsorship activity 
of Latino legislators. Examines the 
effects of institutional characteristics 
(specifically, the percentage of Latinos 
in the chamber) on the link between 
descriptive and substantive 
representation by examining the total 
number of Latino interest bills 
introduced in both chambers of six 
state legislatures for three years in four 
policy areas (specific Latino interests, 
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